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ABSTRACT 
The feud between the U.S. and Iran has smoldered for over thirty years.  Recently, Iran 
has witnessed popular support for reformists decline while government support for 
hardliners has increased.  President Ahmadinejad has increased his rhetoric against Israel 
and the U.S. even as the U.S. changed administrations.  Through it all, Iran has 
apparently continued to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons, despite six United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions and billions of Iran’s dollars frozen.  Each 
progressive round of attempted negotiations results in little more than additional 
sanctions.  It is time to question the U.S. approach and reevaluate the U.S. strategy of 
deterring Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons.  This research develops a deterrence 
strategy for use against Iran based on the results of an inductive case study of Iran and the 
history of its nuclear energy and nuclear weapons program.  By examining Iran and the 
history of its nuclear program and nuclear weapons program, the correct deterrence lens 
Iran should be viewed through will be deduced, and those entities that are most important 
for the nuclear weapons program will be identified.  A deterrence strategy focused on 
those entities is then developed. 
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The feud between the U.S. and Iran has smoldered for over thirty years.  In the 
last ten years, Iran has witnessed popular support for reformists decline while 
government support for hardliners has increased.  President Ahmadinejad has increased 
his rhetoric against Israel and the U.S. even as the U.S. changed administrations.  
Through it all, Iran appears to have continued to pursue nuclear weapons, despite six 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions and billions of Iran’s dollars frozen.  Each 
progressive round of attempted negotiations seemingly results in little more than 
additional sanctions, with the net outcome being that Iran seems bent on pursuing nuclear 
weapons.  It is time to question the U.S. approach and reevaluate the U.S. strategy of 
deterring Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons.  This research will develop a deterrence 
strategy for use against Iran, but will do so based off the results of an inductive case study 
of Iran and the history of its nuclear energy and nuclear weapons program.  Deterrence 
theorists are quick to identify which theory they think works best for Iran, but often fall 
short on solid recommendations based on key Iranian entities involved.  By examining 
Iran and the history of its nuclear program and nuclear weapons program, the correct 
deterrence lens Iran should be viewed through will be deduced, and those entities that are 
most important for the nuclear weapons program will be identified.  A deterrence strategy 
based off those results will then be developed and focused on those entities.  This 
research will expand the existing body of deterrence literature and provide a deterrence 
strategy designed for use by policy-makers. 
Before any discussion of deterring Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons can begin, 
one must first have a solid understanding of the wide variety of deterrence theories. The 
first main theory is that of Classical Realism and the Rational Actor model.1  This theory 
explains a state’s actions in terms of the state being a rational actor, where rationality is 
defined as weighing the costs and benefits of actions against the goal and then choosing 
                                                 
1 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1966). 
 2 
the logical choice.2  This is the main theory behind James Lindsay’s and Ray Takeyh’s 
article in Foreign Affairs entitled, “After Iran Gets the Bomb: Containment and 
Complications,” as well as the two critiques of that article from Barry Posen and Barry 
Rubin.3  James Russell’s article, “A Tipping Point Realized?  Nuclear Proliferation in the 
Persian Gulf and the Middle East,” makes a similar case albeit under neo-realism.4   
While the “Rational Actor” model is never explicitly stated in these publications, it is 
clear from the authors’ use of treating Iran or Tehran as a singular entity that is 
representative of the whole, that this is the model they are using to guide the strategy they 
are recommending.  Furthermore, the authors do not state what should be done to deter or 
coerce Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon; rather they simply lay out a policy of 
containment that should be undertaken once Iran already has obtained a nuclear weapon. 
Admittedly, Posen does not think Iran is a rational actor, yet he continues to describe its 
behavior and reactions in such terms.   
According to this theory, Iran is a rational actor whose behavior should be easily 
predicated when Iran is presented with a set of choices that have both positive and 
negative outcomes.  As long as the benefits of the positive choices outweigh the costs of 
the negative choices, then Iran should choose the positive choice.  This theory predicts 
that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is the result of Iran’s perception that it will benefit 
more in the long run from having nuclear weapons than it will suffer in the short run from 
attempting to acquire them.  The benefits that Iran likely sees from obtaining nuclear 
weapons are increased security, increased power, and increased regional and global 
prestige.  In Iran’s mind, all of these benefits will more than compensate in the long run 
                                                 
2 Karen Mingst, Essentials of International Relations Third ed., (New York:  W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2004). 
3 James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyk, “After Iran Gets the Bomb:  Containment and Complications,” 
Foreign Affairs 89, no. 2 (March 2010). 
Barry Posen, “The Containment Conundrum:  How Dangerous is a Nuclear Iran?,” Foreign Affairs 89, 
no. 4 (July 2010).  
Barry Rubin, “The Right Kind of Containment,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 4 (July 2010).  
4 James Russell, “’A Tipping Point Realized?  Nuclear Proliferation in the Persian Gulf and the Middle 
East,” Contemporary Security Policy, 29:3, 521-537, 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all?content=10.1080/13523260802514860, accessed 
March 3, 2011. 
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for what Iran likely sees as the costs of pursuing nuclear weapons:  short-term economic 
sanctions and global stigmatization. 
The next theory, the Organizational Behavior Model, looks at the state as a 
collection of groups, and any actions taken by the government are the result of the 
standard operating procedures of the main groups that comprise the government.5  This 
means that the action a state takes will be very close to the actions that would be taken 
normally by a group within that government, if that group were in power.  The current 
sanctions targeted against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) indicate a strong belief in the policy-makers’ minds 
that this deterrence lens has considerable merit.   
This model would predict the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons to be the result 
of the standard operating procedures of the main groups or organizations that comprise 
the government.  The main groups that comprise the government are the Office of the 
Supreme Leader, the President and his Vice Presidents and Cabinet, the AEOI, the IRGC, 
the Supreme National Security Council, and the Majles.  The Supreme Leader controls 
the IRGC, and the President controls the AEOI.  Since the IRGC is tasked with defending 
the revolution and is in control of the installations where the nuclear program is housed, 
then this theory predicts that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is the result of both the 
IRGC’s interests and its standard operating procedures to develop the best weapons 
possible in order to defend the revolution.  Additionally, the AEOI is tasked with 
developing the nuclear program in general and thus critical aspects of the nuclear 
weapons program—such as advanced uranium enrichment—are standard outcomes of 
development of a civilian nuclear energy program.   
While the above two theories focus on the larger aspects of national actions, the 
next major theory looks at the individuals within those organizations and groups.  The 
Governmental Politics theory views government actions as the political result of the 
bargaining that occurs amongst the key players.6  The key players look out after their 
                                                 
5 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision (New York:  Longman, 1999), 391. 
6 Ibid. 
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own or their group’s best interests, and thus the nation’s actions are best understood by 
knowing the agendas and interests of the key players within the government.7  The 
current sanctions are also the product of policy-makers believing this theory holds merit.  
The sanctions that target key individuals within the IRGC, the AEOI, the nuclear 
program, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program are illustrative of this 
theory.   
This theory predicts that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is the result of the 
political bargaining that occurs amongst the key players.  The key players for this issue 
are the Supreme Leader, the President, the Speaker of the Majles, the Commander of the 
IRGC, and the head of the AEOI.  This theory would therefore predict that Iran’s pursuit 
of nuclear weapons is the result of political bargaining between those individuals and that 
each individual and/or group would receive some positive benefit from pursuing nuclear 
weapons.  Developing nuclear weapons would benefit Khamenei by establishing him as 
the ultimate protector of Shia Islam.  It would benefit Ahmadinejad by increasing his 
political power and support.  It would benefit the leaders of the IRGC because they would 
be rewarded by Khamenei, and it would benefit the leaders of the AEOI because they 
would be rewarded by Ahmadinejad.  It would additionally benefit the members of the 
Supreme National Security Council by increasing their power and prestige, while 
members of the Majles that supported the program would benefit from increased power 
as a result of increased popular support.     
While the three main theories comprise the main levels of interaction when 
dealing with a government—individuals, groups, and the nation as whole, there are also 
theories that do not include rationality in their descriptions.  These next several theories 
all apply to the individual level.  They include Psychological and Cognitive deterrence 
theories, as well as Prospect Theory.  Overall, these theories seek to base deterrence 
strategies off of a more thorough understanding of the key individuals involved.  They 
seek to classify the leadership style of the decision makers—whether they are, “foxes or 
                                                 
7 Ibid.  
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hedgehogs” in their ability to either manage issues, or dig deep into them.8  Whether or 
not the decision makers hold to unusual beliefs, such as mysticism, or whether they are 
on drugs that may affect their mental state are also critical information requirements 
needed before a deterrence strategy is made.9  In addition, it is also critical to understand 
to what degree those key leaders and decision makers need cognitive consistency in their 
processing of information, and also to what degree they are emotion-based decision 
makers whereby they make decisions to meet their emotional needs.10   
Another theory to examine is that of Neo-Liberal Institutionalism.  Karen Mingst 
describes Neo-Liberal Institutionalism as the theory that asks why states cooperate.11  
Institutionalists argue that ultimately the reason states cooperate is because each is better 
off cooperating with the other given that the states in question will continue to interact 
with each other indefinitely.12  In addition, Institutionalists favor a mixed-actor model 
that includes NGOs, international organizations and other non-state players.13  John 
Tirman, in his paper, “A New Approach to Iran,” argues that it is time for the U.S. to take 
a “giant leap forward” in its relations with Iran.14  He argues that both countries have 
mutual interests in the stability of Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East as a whole, and 
both have mutual interests in the economic and energy sector as well.  In his article, 
“Sanctions against Iran:  A Promising Struggle,” Michael Jacobson emphasizes the need 
for the U.S. to leverage the institutions of the UN and the UN Security Council, the 
European Union as well as the Financial Action Task Force and alliances in order 
                                                 
8 Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence Against Irrational Adversaries?” in Complex Deterrence, 
ed. T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 
64. 
9 Keith Payne, “The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction,” Comparative Strategy,  
Vol. 22, 2003, pp. 411-428. 
10 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I 
Deter,” World Politics 41, no. 2 (1989, Jan), 208-224. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010408  Accessed: 
22/06/2009 19:54 
11 Mingst, Essentials of International Relations, 63. 
12 Ibid., 64. 
13 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London:  
Penguin Books, 1998), 362. 
14 John Tirman, “A New Approach to Iran,” MIT Center for International Studies, (April 2009), 3-5, 
http://web.mit.edu/cis/Publications/IRAN-Tirman_2009.pdf, accessed February 26, 2011. 
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convince Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program.15  While neither author poses a 
viewpoint that encompasses all aspects of Neo-Liberal Institutionalism, both have enough 
aspects that they do fit under that label.  Since neither the U.S. nor Iran is fully 
cooperating with each other right now, this theory predicts that the reason is because at 
least one side views itself as being better off it if does not cooperate.  Iran may fit this 
description since its current leaders enjoy widespread popular support for the nuclear 
program, and thus the nuclear program is serving to garner popular domestic support.16    
While theories are important, the current strategy being employed against Iran is 
equally important as well.  The current U.S. strategy to deter Iran from producing nuclear 
weapons is to place sanctions on Iran’s energy sector—to include foreign companies 
seeking to invest in Iran’s energy sector—and the IRGC and the AEOI.17  These efforts 
date back to 1996 when the U.S. passed the Iran Sanctions Act which authorized the 
penalization of any foreign company that tried to invest in Iran’s energy sector.18   The 
sanctions have steadily increased over the course of three different administrations, 
culminating in the most recent—and harshest—set of sanctions, United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1929.19  These sanctions targeted Iran’s energy sector to 
include the Atomic Energy Organizations of Iran, nuclear program and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) program (to include ballistic missiles), Iran’s banking sector with 
regards to support for the IRGC, and over 80 Iranian persons, companies, and 
organizations that are affiliated with the nuclear program, the missile program, the WMD 
program, the IRGC, the Quds Force, and terrorist organizations to include Hezbollah, 
                                                 
15 Michael Jacobson, “Sanctions against Iran:  A Promising Struggle,” The Washington Quarterly 31, 
no. 3 (2008), 69-88. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/wq/summary/v031/31.3.jacobson.html, accessed March 
10, 2011. 
16 International Peace Institute with Charney Research “Iran:  Public Opinion on Foreign, Nuclear, 
and Domestic Issues,” December 8, 2010, http://csis.org/files/publication/101227_PRS-
Iran_Poll_IPI_Policy_Forum.pdf, accessed September 29, 2011. 
17U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman, 
CRS Report RS20871 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, August 3, 
2010), 2.     
18 Ibid.  
19 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman, 
CRS Report RS20871 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, August 3, 
2010), 2 
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Hamas, and Palestinian Islmaic Jihad.20 What is most interesting about this is that the 
IRGC is the organization responsible for running the nuclear installations, the missile 
program, the WMD program, and the Quds Force. 
This strategy shows that the U.S. policy, as evidenced by the leading American 
role in getting UNSCR 1929 passed, is largely based on the hypothesis that the best way 
to view Iran is with the Organizational Behavior Model.  The U.S. strategy is effectively 
targeting the IRGC because it views the AEOI and the IRGC as key organizations for the 
U.S. to place its deterrence pry bar on in order to force Iran away from its pursuit of 
nuclear weapons.  As of yet however, this strategy has failed to work.  A new strategy is 
needed, one founded upon a more accurate understanding of Iran.  Therefore, this paper 
will use an inductive approach based on the history of Iran’s nuclear program to first gain 
a better understanding of Iran, in order to answer the question of “how can the U.S. deter 
Iran from its pursuit of nuclear weapons?”  The hypothesis of this paper is that Iran is 
actually best viewed through a Classical Realism lens and is seeking to increase its power 
and security through the development of nuclear weapons.   
A. METHODOLOGY 
This hypothesis will be tested by conducting an inductive case study of Iran and 
the history of its nuclear program.  It will examine U.S. interest in Iran, and then provide 
a more in-depth look at the history of Iran’s nuclear program in order to identify those 
key individuals, groups, and institutions most important to the Iranian nuclear weapons 
program.   From there it will identify which deterrence lens the U.S. should view Iran 
through. Once that lens is established and background is provided, a new deterrence 
strategy will be delineated that is founded on the lens identified by the inductive case 
study, and that is focused on the U.S. interests, and the key individuals, groups, and 
institutions induced from the case study.  
                                                 
20 Katzman, “Iran Sanctions,” 42. 
 8 
B. AMERICAN INTERESTS  
The United States’ interests in Iran are wide and varied.  They range from the 
economic interests to security interests and even diplomatic interests.  Part of 
understanding the U.S. interests in Iran is comprehending the impact of Iranian 
development of nuclear weapons on the U.S. economy, the international economy and the 
Middle East regionally.   
1. U.S. Economic Interests 
If the U.S. wants to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, there are several 
economic aspects it should analyze before attempting to do so.  The first is Iran’s geo-
strategic location.  Since it could feasibly control the Straits of Hormuz and thus shut off 
40% of the world’s oil supply, it has significant leverage over the global community.  
With a global recession currently underway, the tremendous increase in the price per 
barrel of oil that would result just from an Iranian statement that it would shut down the 
Straits of Hormuz would further deepen the recession.  If the Iranians were to actually 
attempt to control the Straits, the result would be even worse.  Either case would likely 
precipitate military action by the U.S. Navy to secure the Straits and enable safe passage 
for merchant shipping.  So any deterrence strategy the United States decides to take 
should keep the Iranian ability to close the Straits in mind. 
Another economic aspect to the Iranian nuclear weapons problems is that of the 
current financial benefit that United States is reaping from the perception in the Middle 
East that Iran will obtain nuclear weapons.  The Gulf States are rapidly upgrading their 
current military equipment and purchasing new weapons systems in preparation for a 
more aggressive, nuclear-armed Iran.  In 2010, the United States signed arms deals with 
the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia worth $122.88 billion.21  These deals resulted in the 
UAE purchasing Thaad—a high altitude missile defense system, as well as upgrading 
                                                 
21 Roula Khalaf and James Drummond, “Gulf States in $123bn US arms spree,” Financial Times, 
September 20, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ffd73210-c4ef-11df-9134-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1TtRqR5vP, accessed August 2, 2011. 
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their current Patriot missile defense systems.22 Kuwait likewise upgraded their Patriot 
missile systems, as well as their air force, while Oman both upgraded 12 of its current F-
16s and purchased an additional 18.23  Saudi Arabia purchased over $60 billion in new 
equipment including 85 new F-15s, upgraded another 70 current fighters, and began 
modernizing its eastern fleet.24  Included in these contracts are also all the maintenance 
contracts, thus further tying the United States and the Gulf States together.  So while Iran 
continues its bluster, it is only serving to strengthen the Gulf States militarily, strengthen 
the ties between the Gulf States and the United States, and enrich the United States.  
However the U.S. has shown in the past that it is willing to forego business ventures in 
order to maintain stability, so the short-term economic benefits should not outweigh the 
long-term costs of Iran developing nuclear weapons.  Those costs include the 
destabilizing and undermining the security of the region. 
2. Security and Stability Interests 
If Iran is able to successfully develop a nuclear weapon, both the security and 
stability of the region will be significantly affected.  Saudi Arabia has already strongly 
hinted that should Iran develop nuclear weapons, then Saudi might do so as well.25  
Turkey has also been cited as a country that has restarted its nuclear program as a result 
of Iran’s perceived quest for nuclear weapons.26  Egypt too has hinted that it would 
develop a nuclear weapons program if Iran was able to develop a nuclear weapon, though 
this was before the fall of Mubarak.27  Though a nuclear-arms race may eventually result 
                                                 
22 Khalaf and Drummond, Financial Times. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.. 
25 Jay Solomon, “Saudi Suggests Squeezing Iran Over Nuclear Ambitions,” Wall Street Journal, June 
22, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304887904576400083811644642.html, 
accessed September 15, 2011. 
26 Karl Vick, “Energy, Iran Spur Turkey’s Revival of Nuclear Program,” Washington Post, March 7, 
2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/06/AR2006030601513.html, 
accessed September 15, 2011. 
27 Will Fulton, Ariel Farrar-Wellman, Robert Frasco, “Egypt-Iran Foreign Relations,” 
IranTracker.Org, August 22, 2011, http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/egypt-iran-foreign-
relations, accessed September 15, 2011. 
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in a new level of regional stability due to the most powerful countries in the region 
having nuclear weapons, it would also mean that the most advanced and dangerous 
weapons ever invented would reside in the countries that are not the most stable.  In the 
last 90 years, Egypt has had three wars, one military intervention, two coups, and one 
assassination of the president.28   During the same time period, Turkey experienced two 
major wars, invaded Cypress, and had four coups, while Saudi Arabia has experienced 
the overthrow of one king, the assassination of the next and significant social unrest both 
in the 1979–1980 period as well as in 2011.29  Additionally, all three countries continue 
to have terrorist activities directed against them and have terrorists living inside their 
borders.  These are not historically stable countries and should those countries develop 
nuclear weapons, it is possible that they may fall into the wrong hands during a period of 
instability.   
Even if those weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists during a period of 
instability, Iran may still provide a terrorist group it sponsors with a nuclear weapon.  
Iran is known to support Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas, as well as 
numerous insurgent groups, terrorists, and militias in Iraq and Afghanistan.30  Iranian 
support specifically to Hezbollah is likely the largest amount of state support a terrorist 
group has received.   One U.S. Department of Defense report stated that Iran provides an 
estimated $100 million to $200 million of support annually to Hezbollah, and this amount 
does not include how much more is provided to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad or Hamas.31  
Another report stated that Hezbollah has over 40,000 rockets stockpiled near the Israeli 
                                                 
28 “Timeline:  Egypt,” BBC News, August 3, 2011, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/790978.stm, accessed September 16, 2011. 
29 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2010),  
p. 136–137. 
30 Kenneth M. Pollack, et al., Which Path to Persia? (Washington, D.C.:  Brookings Institute Press, 
2009), p. 13. 
31 Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran, April 2010, 
http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/IranReportUnclassified.pdf,accessed September 16, 2011.  
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border, courtesy of Iran.32  In addition, Iran is known to have conducted at least one 
assassination in Berlin, and is believed to have been responsible for the Beirut bombing 
of the U.S. Marine barracks in 1983, Jewish and Israeli centers in South America in the 
1990s, and the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996.33  Iran has also supplied 
substantial amounts of weapons, equipment, and training used against U.S. forces both in 
Iraq and Afghanistan as well.34  Given Iran’s history of sponsoring terrorism and arming 
terrorist groups that attack U.S. interests and U.S. allies’ interests around the world, it is 
not a far stretch to consider that Iran may give a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group to 
attack a U.S. interest or U.S. ally’s interests. 
It is important to note the Iraq and Afghanistan are both U.S. allies currently.  
Iran’s sponsorship of anti-American forces in both locations highlights Iran’s ability to 
either help or hinder the U.S. accomplish its objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Even 
though the U.S. and Iran have publicly been at odds with each other recently, they 
worked together covertly from 2001–2003 to coordinate policy of Afghanistan, which 
was Iran’s biggest enemy to its east, and then again overtly in 2007–2008 to talk about 
Iraq—Iran’s former greatest enemy to its west.35  In addition, both the Taliban and 
Saddam Hussein were Iran’s greatest enemies, and therefore the U.S. actually provided 
Iran a favor by eliminating both.  Regardless, the issues of Iraq and Afghanistan are 
related to the issue of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons in that both countries currently 
provide an avenue that Iran may use to strike back at the U.S. in the event the U.S. 
undertakes an action deemed undesirable by Iran.     
Another problem that might develop if Iran develops nuclear weapons is that of 
regional sectarian conflict.  The Arab leadership throughout the Gulf is concerned about, 
“the prestige and the boost that it would give to Iranian political penetration of the 
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region.”36 This fear has increase substantially since the Arab Spring of 2011 as the 
masses throughout the region began pressing for self-determination.37  The Arab leaders’ 
fears are that given the current sectarian tensions in the region and political climate, if 
Iran develops a nuclear weapon, the Arab Shia populations will become emboldened to 
revolt.  This fear is further enflamed by the history that exists between Iran and the Gulf 
States.  Iran is suspected of being involved in trying to overthrow the governments of 
Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, not to mention Lebanon and Israel as well.38  Given 
this history, should Iran achieve a nuclear weapon, the Arab leaders will become even 
more nervous about their Shia populations. 
A larger-picture issue that the U.S. is interested in as a result of Iran’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons is the precedent the world is setting by not stopping Iran’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons.  As counter-proliferation expert Jon Wolfsthal says, “Iran has 
systematically violated international laws and obligations not to pursue nuclear weapons 
and to place key nuclear assets under inspection for two decades.”39 So if Iran is 
successful in developing nuclear weapons, Iran will set the precedence that other 
countries may sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Additional Protocol, not 
abide by the standards therein, and suffer no serious consequences as a result.  
Furthermore, on the more practical side, Iran has demonstrated that it was 
susceptible to coercion through military force, but this may change if Iran develops 
nuclear weapons.  In 1999, Turkey bombed Iranian territory to punish Iran for sheltering 
a Kurdish insurgent group that had been attacking Turkish soldiers for years.40  In 
response, Iran stopped sheltering them, thus showing it was susceptible to coercion 
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through military force.41   However, if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, the stakes may 
grow too high to attempt to change Iran’s behavior by using military force since Iran may 
threaten retaliation with a nuclear weapon. 
To summarize, the two biggest goals the United States has regarding Iran and its 
pursuit of nuclear weapons are that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon, and that Iran 
stops sponsoring terrorism. 42  These goals are directly tied to the dominate U.S. interest 
in the region—stability.  Stability means stable oil prices, and oil is the fuel for the 
modern economy.  As long as the oil prices are stable, then the costs of doing business—
moving cargo, shipping products, etc.—remains low.  However, if prices rise, and rise 
suddenly, then recessions will likely result.  In fact, according to economist James 
Hamilton, ten out of the eleven recessions the U.S. has experienced since WWII were 
associated with a dramatic rise in the price of oil.43   As Calvin Coolidge once said, “the 
chief aim of the American people is business.  They are profoundly concerned with 
producing, buying, selling, investing, and prospering in the world.”44  As long as the 
Middle East is stable, then the oil prices will also remain relatively stable.  However the 
Middle East is not stable, and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is not helping the 
situation.   
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II. UNDERSTANDING IRAN’S PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 
The main problem the West has when dealing with Iran may be that the West 
does not understand Iran.  This problem is compounded by the fact that the United States 
has no Embassy within Iran.  As such, any information the U.S. receives on Iran is tainted 
with whatever lens is applied by the go-between.  While the world media is a source of 
information on Iran, it often lacks the in-depth insight into the personal motivations or 
political in-fighting that caused the action to occur.  The “why” is crucial to 
understanding both a person’s actions and a state’s actions because effective deterrence 
and compellence strategies are frequently targeted against such motivations.  As such, 
this chapter will seek to analyze Iran’s behavior with regard to its pursuit of nuclear 
weapons in order to determine the best deterrence theory or theories to use against Iran in 
order to convince Iran to stop pursuing nuclear weapons.  Therefore, it is imperative that 
the history of Iran’s nuclear program is analyzed first in order to determine the 
individuals and groups most involved.  From there, the focus moves to the two main 
individuals, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, and explains each man’s role and beliefs about 
the nuclear weapons program.  The focus then shifts to the three main groups identified 
by the historical analysis as being involved in the nuclear weapons program:  the Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), and the 
Supreme National Defense Council.  Additionally, the role of the Majles, or Parliament, 
is also examined in order to determine the extent of their role in the nuclear weapons 
program.  Finally, an explanation of why Unitary, Rational Actor theory, coupled with 
Organizational Process theory and Governmental Politics theory provide the best 
explanatory power in understanding Iran’s continual pursuit of nuclear weapons.  Before 
that can begin, an understanding of the nuclear fuel cycle is required to understand the 
crux of the matter. 
 16 
A. NUCLEAR FUEL CELL BACKGROUND 
In order to comprehend the importance of this issue, an understanding of the 
nuclear fuel cycle is helpful.  A nuclear reactor requires nuclear fuel.  Nuclear fuel is 
made by processing uranium ore.  Naturally occurring uranium ore consists of two 
isotopes, roughly 0.7% of U235, and 99.3% of U238.45  Civilian nuclear-energy reactors 
require the U235 to be enriched to roughly 3–5%, while research reactors require uranium 
enriched up to approximately 20% U235.46  To have nuclear weapons requires the 
uranium to be enriched to approximately 90% or more U235.47  The problem lies in the 
fact that the same process is used to enrich uranium for use in a civilian reactor as is used 
to make uranium for use in a nuclear weapon.48  So while it is possible for Iran to simply 
buy reactor fuel from other countries, having to do so would still place Iran in the 
strategically vulnerable position of being dependent on other countries for its fuel.   
B. HISTORY OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM 
The origin of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons dates back to 1957 when the U.S. 
and Iran signed an agreement regarding civilian nuclear cooperation as part of the U.S. 
State Department’s Atoms for Peace program.49  In 1973, the Shah’s interest began 
increasing rapidly after a study was published by the U.S.-based Stanford Research 
Institute which highlighted Iran’s need for nuclear energy due the life-expectancy of the 
Iranian oil reserves (a decline in production was expected between 2010–2020).50  In 
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1974, the Shah established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).51  By the 
mid-1970s, the Shah’s interest in his nuclear program had expanded from nuclear energy 
to obtaining nuclear weapons.52  At some point during the mid-1970s, the founder and 
first president of the AEOI, Akbar Etemad, asked the Shah if he wanted the capability to 
build a bomb.53   The Shah reportedly replied that it was premature to do so then [mid-
1970s], but that if the security situation changed in the next decade or two, then it would 
become a priority.54  As a result, Etemad created a special team for nuclear research 
designed to give Iranian decision-makers the option for Iran to make a bomb, and make it 
quickly, should the need arise.55   
But until the time that Iran needed a nuclear weapon, the Shah was mainly 
interested in nuclear energy.  Between 1974 and 1976, the Shah signed agreements for 
sixteen reactors:  two from a French company, eight from the U.S., and six from German 
companies.56  In 1978, Iran and the U.S. signed the U.S.—Iran Nuclear Energy 
Agreement in Tehran, right before the Iranian Revolution began.57   
While the Iranian Islamic Revolution ended the Shah’s nuclear program in 1979, 
the war with Iraq provided the impetus to restart it.  Saddam’s use of chemical weapons, 
combined with the relative stalemate between Iran and Iraq in the mid-1980s, led the 
then-Chairmen of the Parliament, Hashemi-Rafsanjani to search for help from the 
Europeans, to no avail.58  However, in 1987 he found A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear 
scientist who is now widely renowned for his illegal nuclear black market network, and 
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obtained the plans for the P-1 centrifuge as well as a gas centrifuge.59  During this same 
time, Rafsanjani also signed nuclear cooperation agreements with both Pakistan and 
Argentina in which both countries agreed to train a specific number of Iranian 
scientists.60  In 1989, President Rafsanjani signed a nuclear cooperation pact with 
Russia.61 The early and mid-1990s saw initial agreements between Russia and Iran, as 
well as China and Iran, however, by the late 1990s, substantial international pressure 
forced Russia and China to pull out of the agreements.62  As Mohammad Javad Zarif, 
former Iranian-envoy to the United Nations, said, “As a result, Iran was left with no other 
option but to be discreet in its peaceful activities.”63   
During this time period, a sub-cartel comprised of the IRGC and physicists at the 
Sharif Technological University emerged at Iran’s Atomic Energy Institute.64  This sub-
cartel was responsible for the nuclear development project which began in 1999, even 
though the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was not informed by Iran of a 
new project.65  This is important because Iran was a signatory of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and that treaty requires all signatories to inform the IAEA when 
starting a new project.66  Fortunately an exiled opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq 
(MEK) exposed Iran’s, “operation of a centrifuge uranium enrichment plant in Natanz 
and a heavy water plant in Arak in August 2002.”67 This revelation created an 
international crisis and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council became involved.68   
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For the next events, it is important to have the historical context.  The U.S. 
invaded Afghanistan, Iran’s neighbor, in October 2001, after the Afghanistan-based Al 
Qaeda terrorist organization attacked the U.S. on September 11, 2001.  Several months 
later, Iran was caught smuggling 50 tons of weapons, ammunition, and explosives to the 
Palestinian Authority in January 2002.69 Several weeks after this event, on January 29, 
2002, President Bush gave his famous “Axis of Evil” speech in which he accused Iran of 
being part of the axis of evil in the world whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction 
threatened global peace.70  This resulted in the international community becoming highly 
sensitive to missteps by states that had effectively been “placed on notice” by the United 
States—a country with the most powerful military in the world, and who had just itself 
become highly sensitive towards terrorism or anyone supporting terrorism.  So it was 
against this background that one month after the MEK revealed the secret plants at 
Natanz and Arak, the U.S. began building a case in the international community against 
Iraq and Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.   
Now during this time, President Khatami, a reformist, had replaced President 
Rafsanjani inside Iran, and both Khatami and the Supreme Leader Khamenei saw the 
winds of violent change beginning to surround them when the U.S.-sponsored UN 
ultimatum targeting Iran was passed in September 2003.  The ultimatum called for Iran to 
cooperate by the end of October 2003 and threatened UN Security Council action if Iran 
did not comply.71  As such, Khatami and Khamenei placed the Secretary of the Supreme 
National Security Council, Dr. Hasan Ruhani, in control of the negotiations with the 
IAEA in October 2003.72   
The political environment that Ruhani had to operate in was difficult.  When 
Rafsanjani was President, he had a radicalist domestic policy, but a pragmatic foreign 
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policy.73  When Khatami became President in 1997, he had a reformist domestic policy 
in which he tried to expand the freedoms of the average Iranian citizen and focus more on 
democracy and civil society.74  However, the Guardian Council blocked Khatami’s and 
the reformists’ in the Majles (Parliament) attempts to make new laws, on the basis that 
the reforms violated both the Shari’a and the Constitution.75  In addition, Khamenei’s 
hardliners twisted the laws and used them politically against Khatami and his 
reformists.76  Though Khatami was re-elected by a landslide in 2001, by 2003, he was 
largely ineffective.  As a result of Khatami’s attempts in trying to reform the Iranian 
society, the hardliners—who did not want reforms and who instead wanted to return to 
more of the revolutionary path—began gaining strength.  In 2003, this process had 
already begun and thus when Ruhani had to negotiate with IAEA and the EU, there were 
two camps within the Iranian government:  those who could sense the international 
pressure and thought it wise to acquiesce to international demands, and the hardliners 
who wanted to push nuclear development full speed, ignore international pressure and the 
IAEA, and force the U.S. and the West to, “make major concessions similar to those it 
was making for North Korea.”77   
Ruhani, being more pragmatic than radical, reached an agreement with the EU-3 
(France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) on October 21, 2003, in which Iran would, 
“voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment and sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty 
(NPT)’s Additional Protocol on international inspection.”78    Furthermore, Ruhani 
concluded negotiations on the Paris agreement of November 15, 2004, with the EU-3 
though neither side ever fully signed it.79  The agreement offered the following:  support 
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for Iran entering into the World Trade Organization; a measure aimed at antiterrorism 
cooperation whereby the MEK would be placed in the same category as Al Qaeda; and 
uranium enrichment only for peaceful purposes for Iran, all in exchange for the IAEA 
having unrestricted inspection access to Iran’s nuclear program.80   
However, between the time that Ruhani began negotiations in October 2003, and 
the time the Paris agreement reached finality in November 2004, the Iranian 
Parliamentary elections were held.  The Guardian Council disqualified over 2500 
potential delegates, and by doing so ensured that the conservatives gained control over 
the Parliament.81  Thus the conservative-dominated Parliament began sounding 
rumblings in August 2004 about possibly passing a bill that obligated the government to 
resume the nuclear program.82  Once the IAEA passed a resolution calling for suspension 
of all enrichment-related activities however, on 31 October 2004, the Iranian Parliament 
passed a bill that obligated the government to resume activity on the nuclear program, to 
include uranium-enrichment activities.83   However, no date was set by Parliament for 
when the government should resume activity and thus many political analysts believed 
Parliament’s actions as largely symbolic.84 It is important to note however, that this 
action by Parliament may have served as an additional negotiating tactic by the Iranians 
to drive the EU-3 into agreement on the Paris treaty—which the EU-3 agreed to on 
November 15th. 
The EU-3 took several months in reviewing the Paris agreement, and when they 
finally provided a counter-offer to Iran in August of 2005, it was based on the contingent 
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that Iran would cease enrichment production.85  Iran did not prefer this, thus did not 
accept the counter-offer, and instead pulled out of the Additional Protocol.  On August 8, 
2005, Iran resumed its enrichment of uranium that it had voluntarily halted since 2003.86  
Perhaps as a way of trying to signal to the West that Iran only wanted nuclear energy, 
Khamenei issued a fatwa that stated that, “production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear 
weapons” was against the beliefs of Islam.87  In addition, on November 19th, the 
Parliament passed another bill that obligated the government to suspend the all the 
voluntary steps Iran had taken to build confidence amongst the international community 
in the last three years, if that IAEA referred the Iranian case to the UN Security Council 
on November 24.88  However, the IAEA did not refer the Iranian case to the UNSC until 
February 4, 2006, and so no actions were taken based on the Parliamentary bill, and once 
again Parliament’s actions were viewed by many as largely symbolic.89 
President Ahmadinejad was elected by the hardliners in 2005 and his assumption 
of power in Iran represented a tide-change in the struggle between the pragmatists such as 
Ruhani, and the hardliners.  It was only a small step then, when Ahmadinejad announced 
in April 2006 that since Iran had enriched a small amount of uranium to the low threshold 
level of 3.5%, it therefore just became one of the world’s nuclear countries.90  
Understandably, this caused concern in the western world and a flurry of diplomatic 
activity occurred between April and June 2006, culminating in the five permanent 
members of the Security Council sending a package of incentives to Iran to convince it to 
stop its enrichment activities.91  While Ahmadinejad did not say no, he also did not 
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respond within the deadline.92  This caused the UN Security Council to pass the first of  
six UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), UNSCR 1696, which legally bound Iran 
to stop enriching uranium.93   
When Ahmadinejad took office, yet another important change occurred.  
Khamenei removed Ruhani as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, 
and replaced him with Ali Larijani.94 This is important because according to Article 176 
of Iran’s Constitution, the President is the Council’s Chairman.95   Both Khamenei and 
Khatami had placed Ruhani as the Secretary, and thus Khatami delegated responsibility 
to Ruhani.  However, when Ahmadinejad was elected, Khamenei did not consult 
Ahmadinejad about removing Ruhani—who technically had been operating in the 
President’s authority.   This reflects Khamenei’s shrewd political maneuvering to further 
coalesce his power by usurping the constitutionally provisioned power of the President. 
On August 22, 2006, Iran gave an official reply to the UN Security Council 
saying essentially that it was interested in talks, but ceasing the enrichment of its uranium 
could not be a precondition to those talks.96  The Security Council did not accept Iran’s 
offer, and so on December 23, 2006, UNSCR 1737 was passed, which placed sanctions 
on Iran by ordering all countries to cease providing technology and materials to Iran that 
might contribute to its nuclear and missile programs.97  It also sanctioned ten key Iranian 
companies involved in the two programs, as well as twelve individuals involved in those 
companies, freezing the assets of all twenty-two entities.98  In response, the Iranian 
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Parliament voted on December 27, to call on the government to cut ties with the IAEA 
and to speed up work on the nuclear program.99  
In March 2007, the UNSCR decided to tighten and expand the sanctions even 
further by passing UNSCR 1747.  UNSCR 1747 banned the export of Iranian weapons 
(likely due to the significant number of new Iranians arms, ammunition, and equipment 
being found in the hands of Iraqi insurgents), and froze the assets of an additional fifteen 
people and thirteen organizations involved in either the nuclear program or the missile 
program, or connected to the IRGC.100   
In April 2007, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran was enriching uranium on an 
industrial scale, while Ali Larijani, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, said that they had 
begun injecting gas into 3000 centrifuges—a key step in enrichment.101  In May 2007, 
Ahmadinejad had Ruhani’s deputy in the nuclear negotiations, Mohammad Hossein 
Musavian, arrested for treason.  However, in reality it was because Musavian made 
highly critical remarks about Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policy and failure to avoid UN 
sanctions.102  This was an indicator of the domestic politics and disagreements there 
were occurring within Iran during this time.  In July 2007, Iran and the IAEA announced 
a two-month agreement during which time the IAEA would have access to Iran’s nuclear 
sites in order to clear up unresolved issues.103  By late August, the IAEA said that it was 
able to verify that at the sites it inspected, all nuclear research was for peaceful purposes 
and that it had found no diversion of nuclear material for any other purpose.104  On 
October 27, 2007, Ahmadinejad used his constitutional rights and replaced Ali Larijani, 
whom the Supreme Leader had appointed, with Sa’id Jalili, one of Ahmadinejad’s hand-
picked men.105  Khamenei, knowing that Larijani was a better negotiator, responded by 
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simply appointing Larijani as one of Khamenei’s two representatives on the Supreme 
National Security Council.106  In November, the IAEA’s report on Iran’s compliance and 
research was officially published.  However, Mohammed El Baraadei, the IEAE Director 
General, also added that he still could say definitively that, “some activities may have 
military aspects.”107  Musavian was also acquitted of most charges during November, 
however Ahmadinejad personally prevailed upon the prosecutor and Musavian was given 
a two-year suspended sentence in April 2008.108 
In March 2008, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 1803 which expanded 
once more the number of entities sanctioned for their involvement in Iran’s nuclear and 
missile programs, increased vigilance of Iranian Banks, and highlighted the need for 
countries to inspect the cargoes of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shippling Line and Iran 
Air Cargo.109   In June, evidence mounted that Khamenei was reigning in Ahmadinejad 
when, in a conciliatory manner, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mottaki proposed comprehensive 
talks with the UN, and Ahmadinejad remained quiet for six weeks with none of his usual 
bluster.110 The five foreign ministers of the permanent members of the Security Council 
accepted the proposal with great alacrity, and talks began in July.111  At the same time, 
Khamenei had Ali Akbar Velayati—the Foreign Affairs advisor to the Leader—issue a 
statement that emphasized the constitutional authority of the Supreme Leader to decide, 
“on matters of strategic importance.”112  Furthermore, the statement also affirmed that on 
the basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes, a comprise could be made with the U.S..113  The importance of this is 
that it silenced—albeit temporarily—Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric and portrayed Khamenei as 
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being more moderate that Ahmadinejad.  In September however, the IAEA released a 
report which told of Iran’s progress in centrifuge enrichment, as well as Iran’s resistance 
to address the concerns about its possible nuclear weapons research.114  This report 
caused the UN Security Council to pass UNSCR 1835 on September 27, 2008, which 
reaffirmed the four previous resolutions.  Ahmadinejad’s response was Iran would resist 
the “bullying powers,” while his head negotiator, Sa’id Jalili said the resolutions were not 
conducive to building trust.115 
Having been elected to the Parliament in the 2008 elections, Ali Larijani became 
Speaker of the Parliament.  In April 2009, he announced a much larger role for 
Parliament in the nuclear negotiations when he said that the Parliament would start 
supervising the nuclear negotiations.116  Parliament would only allow talks that fell 
within the framework that the Parliament established and only if the talks were conducted 
within the framework of the Parliamentary resolutions.117  The importance of this is that 
it shows the power over the nuclear negotiations remaining within Khamenei’s hands, 
since Larijani is one of Khamenei’s loyalists. 
In addition, the Presidential Elections were held in 2009.  After the highly 
disputed elections, massive protests and riots broke out across Iran.  Khamenei issued a 
fatwa calling for everyone to return home and accept the outcome of the elections, but 
very few obeyed it.118  Fortunately, for Khamenei, the IRGC owed its loyalty to both 
him and Ahmadinejad, and thus crushed the protests.  This is important because 
Khamenei , as the Supreme Leader, had the ability to issue governmental ordinances that 
are supposed to be obeyed as God’s own commands:  all Iranian shias should obey his 
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fatwas, or so the theory goes.  The fact that his fatwa was not obeyed by the people and 
instead had to be enforced with guns showed Khamenei’s power base had slipped from 
religious to merely coercive—a much weaker platform. 
Regardless, on September 21, 2009, Iran informed the IAEA that it was in the 
process of building a second enrichment facility near Qom.119  This caused great concern 
among the western countries since the facility was in the process of being constructed and 
thus Iran should have told the IAEA about it much earlier.   In October, the U.S., France 
and Russia proposed a deal with Iran that tried to find a compromise between Iran’s 
legitimate right to nuclear energy, and the concerns over Iran having a secret nuclear 
weapons program.120   Ahmadinejad responded that he was willing to cooperate with the 
west, but no response was given to him.121  Furthermore on February 9, 2010, 
Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had enriched uranium to 20%.122  At this same time, 
Ali Akbar Salehi, the current head of the AEOI, announced that they could enrich all the 
way to 100%, if they wanted, or if they needed to.123  This is important because it signals 
that the AEOI had finally achieved the goal that its first president, Akbar Etemad set for 
it back in 1974:  to give the Iranian decision-makers the ability to build a bomb quickly, 
if needed.  In May 2010, Turkey, Brazil and Iran reached an agreement for Iran to ship its 
low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for enriched fuel for a research reactor.124 
Many thought, however, that this agreement was nothing more than a ploy by 
Ahmadinejad to stave off a new round of sanctions.  The U.S. eventually decided this 
agreement did not resolve enough issues, and thus pushed for additional sanctions. These 
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events drove the passing of UNSCR 1929, the strongest of the six sanctions.  UNSCR 
1929, passed on June 9th, 2010 banned Iran from any involvement with ballistic missiles, 
banned all countries from selling military hardware to Iran, banned any training or 
assistance (to include financial) related to arms for Iran, placed a travel ban on numerous 
individuals, and froze the assets of the IRGC and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping 
Lines.125 The final and most recent development in the history of Iran’s nuclear program 
is that the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) released a report on 
February 25, 2011 that continued to highlight Iran’s lack of cooperation as well as 
question possible nuclear weapons-related research.126  
C. INDIVIDUALS 
In understanding Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, it is important to determine 
who the key players are, both individuals and groups.  The history described above is 
crucial because it provides insight into which Iranian leaders made key decisions along 
the way that significantly impacted the development of their nuclear program.  It also 
shows which groups are most heavily involved in the nuclear weapons program.  
Knowing who the key individuals and groups are is important because they might 
represent possible targets for a deterrence strategy.  Presently, the two main persons 
involved in the nuclear weapons issue are Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, while the main 
organizations involved are the AEOI, the IRGC, the Supreme National Security Council, 
and the Parliament.  As such, we will evaluate each in turn, beginning with Khamenei. 
1. Khamenei 
To understand Khamenei’s current position on the nuclear weapons program, one 
must first understand how Khamenei came to that position, and the extent of his power.  
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Historically in Iran, the clergy and the Shah were the two main powers.127  During the 
20th Century though, Reza Khan overthrew the Qajar dynasty, and with the help of the 
clergy, became Shah.  Over the course of the next 25 years, he greatly weakened and 
even humiliated the Shia hierocracy through, “state-building, secularization, and 
modernization.”128  When Khomeini joined in the revolution against the Shah’s son, 
Muhammad Reza Khan, he did so because he was fighting to regain what was lost at the 
hands of Reza Shah—clerical power.129  However, Khomeini did not necessarily think 
that the clergy, or jurists (faqih), were the ones who should run the government.  On the 
contrary, the commonly held belief of the day was that the only legitimate government 
was God’s.  According to Shia Islam, the Imams were God’s representatives on earth and 
as such, were infallible; therefore they were the only ones who could truly govern with 
perfect justice.130    But Khomeini was very aware that nothing written ever said that the 
clergy were kings, or that they were entitled to sovereignty.131  Instead he said, “The 
laws of parliament must be the explication of the very divine law….As we have said 
earlier, we do not say government must devolve on the jurist (faqih).  We say, however, 
that the government must observe the divine law…and this is not possible without the 
supervision of the clergy.”132  This then is the reason that Iran has the requirement that 
the Supreme Leader must be at least an Ayatollah—an expert in the Sharia or Islamic 
Law—because the President and the Majles run the day-to-day operations of the 
government, but the Supreme Leader is the one who presides over the government and 
interjects himself when he observes the government undertaking an action that is contrary 
to Sharia law.  The other time the Supreme Leader becomes involved is when there is a 
dispute amongst the branches of the government.  Khamenei himself, while President, 
received a rebuke from Khomeini for saying that the government’s authority could only 
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be exercised within the Sacred Law.133  Khamenei, having learned from his rebuke, 
expounded upon the concept of the, “God-given absolute mandate” that Khomeini 
believed so important.  Khamenei said: 
The commandments of the ruling jurist (vali-ye fatiq) are primary 
commandments and are like the commandments of God…The regulations 
of the Islamic Republic are Islamic regulations, and obedience to them is 
incumbent….In reality, it is because of the legitimacy of the Mandate [of 
the Jurist] that they all acquire legitimacy.134 
In essence, Khameini said that because the head Jurist (Supreme Leader) had an 
Absolute Mandate from God to rule, then all of his commands are the same as commands 
from God, and all the laws passed were passed with the head Jurist’s consent:  therefore 
the laws were to be regarded as God’s laws as well.  The problem with this train of 
thought is that Khomeini ascribed the power that resided in the infallible Imam to fallible 
men.  He said Ayatollahs should have the same authority as the Imam, and by doing so, 
he created multiple authorities for the laypeople.135  He tried to mitigate this by way of 
stipulating that the Supreme Leader should be a source of imitation (marja-iyyat) or 
Ayatollah, but the sole source of political power.136  However this issue was never 
resolved before Khomeini died.   
There were other problems left unresolved when Khomeini died as well.  In 
addition to the above issue, getting a law passed had become a problem due to the 
Guardian Council striking down numerous laws that the Majles passed.  The Guardian 
Council originally consisted of six Ayatollahs appointed by the Leader; though later it 
was expanded to twelve with the Judiciary nominating—and the Majles approving—the 
other six.137  The Guardian Council was entrusted with the mission of, “protecting the 
ideological foundations of the Constitution” by nullifying “all proposed and existing laws 
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found inconsistent with Islamic standards.”138  As a result of the clash between the 
Guardian Council and the Majles, the Council for the Determination of Interest of the 
Islamic Order, or Maslahat Council (Expediency Council) was created.  It consists of 
both clerics and non-clerics, all of whom are appointed by the Supreme Leader.139   The 
Maslahat Council’s original purpose was to mediate the disputes between the Guardian 
Council and the Majles.140  While this council solved one of the many problems that 
abounded, it did not solve them all.  So shortly before Khomeini died, he ordered a 
review of the Constitution, and a new council was formed called the Council for the 
Revision of the Constitution.141 
The Council for the Revision of the Constitution instituted numerous profound 
changes.  The first major change was the abolishment of the office of the Prime Minister, 
which then gave the Leader the task of determining, “the general policies of the regime,” 
formerly the main task of the Prime Minister.142  The Council then made the President, 
“the Head of the Executive Power,” and placed the cabinet underneath the President.143  
So the formerly diffuse power structure was restructured to give both the Leader and the 
President more power, though the Leader would ultimately receive much more than the 
President.   
The Council further strengthened the President by giving him the power to 
appoint Deputy-Presidents and by giving him the chairmanship duties of the newly 
created Supreme National Security Council.144  Ordinarily the combination of these 
additional powers, combined with having the cabinet fall underneath him would 
seemingly give the President greater power.  And it would have, had the Council not also 
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expanded the power of the Maslahat Council beyond that of mediating disputes between 
the Guardian Council and the Majles.  The Maslahat Council was given the additional 
responsibility of advising the Leader on any matter he specifically referred to them, and 
especially on determining the regime’s general policies.145  This essentially made the 
Leader independent of the President and the cabinet by giving the Leader his own board 
of advisors that reported directly to him.  This board of advisors also includes the 
Supreme Leader’s representative that sits on the Supreme National Security Council, the 
Supreme Leader’s own advisor on Foreign Affairs (instead of the Foreign Minister that is 
appointed by the President), as well as numerous informal connections to the clerics in 
Qum, all of which he uses for advice.146   
Another important change the Council for the Revision of the Constitution 
established was one that affected the Judiciary.  It replaced the Supreme Judiciary 
Council with a single Head of the Judiciary Power, who was to serve a five year time in 
office.147  This also strengthened the Leader because the Leader was given the 
responsibility of appointing the Head of the Judiciary Power.148  The Leader gained even 
more indirect power through this as well since the Head of the Judiciary is also 
responsible for appointing the remaining six members of the Guardian Council.149 
An additional change, and the one that perhaps has had more impact on shaping 
Iranian politics than any of the others, was that the Council added an additional Article 
(177) to the Constitution that authorized the Leader, with the advice of the Maslahat 
Council, to convene an Assembly for Constitutional Review.150  This Assembly had the 
power to create new amendments to the Constitution, but those amendments first had to 
have the Leader’s approval before the public could vote on them in a national 
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referendum.151  The establishment of this Assembly in 1990 would prove to have a 
profound impact upon the elections in 1991, and every election since. 
In 1990, the Assembly used the review process to nominate a new law that gave 
the Guardian Council the right to approve or disapprove the candidacy of any person 
running for office, thus allowing the Guardian Council the ability to narrow the field 
down to only those candidates that the regime felt were safe.152  Since no proposed 
amendment could be put to the vote prior to Khamenei’s approval, and since this idea 
was ultimately adopted in the form of an amendment in 1995, then the passage of this law 
shows Khamenei’s indirect control over elections both by allowing the amendment to 
become legalized, and through the now required pre-vetting process by his appointed 
members of the Guardian Council. 
While the Council restructured the government, eliminated the Prime Minister 
and consolidated power for both the President and the Leader, it is important to 
remember than when Khamenei became the Leader, he also retained all the extra-
constitutional powers that Khomeini enjoyed as well.  Khamenei maintained his control 
of the IRGC, his ability to appoint the commander of the IRGC, and he retained 
executive control of the IRGC’s elite branch, the Quds Force.153  He also kept 
Khomeini’s network of “clerical commisars” that permeated nearly every aspect of 
Iranian government and society, to include the, “government bureaucracy, military and 
security services, religious and mobilizational organizations, the foundations and foreign 
relations, as well as the provincial and municipal Friday prayer leaders.”154  In the land 
where everything must be in accordance with the religious law, ostensibly these clerics 
provided religious guidance to the organizations they were in, but in reality they provided 
an informal intelligence network and power-channel for Khomeini.  Khamenei’s Office 
of the Supreme Leader expanded this informal intelligence network even further by 
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developing special ties with both the intelligence organizations and the Special Court for 
Clerics.155 
The Special Court for Clerics was originally established in June 1987 in order to 
deal with two problems.156  The first was the problem of Khomeini’s younger and more 
radical clerics that were beginning to get out of control.157  The second was the problem 
of the Iran-Contra affair being leaked to the news by Sayyed Mehdi Hashemi.158  The 
Court convicted Hashemi in August, and he was executed in September of 1987.159  Ever 
since, the Leader has used the Court as his main instrument for discipline against elite but 
errant clerics.160  This has resulted in a general “cowing” effect upon the clerics within 
Iran and silenced any clerics who posed a perceived threat to the regime. 
At this point, it is helpful to review the Leader’s power.  He is the head of all 
three branches of government, and exercises power directly by involving himself in 
certain issues, and indirectly through his appointing power.  Since he appoints the Head 
of the Judiciary, he indirectly controls the Judiciary.  He also appoints half the members 
of the Guardian Council who have clerical oversight on the laws passed by the Majles—
which is popularly elected—and he controls the Maslahat Council indirectly through his 
ability to appoint the members.  Since the Maslahat Council both adjudicates 
disagreements between the Guardian Council and the Majles, it shows Khamenei’s ability 
to exercise negative control the popularly elected Majles, meaning he can stop the Majles 
from doing something he does not want, but cannot legally make the Majles do 
something that he does want.   
When a hardliner finally replaced a reformist as the president in 2005, Khamenei 
began to relax his supervision over the Executive branch and delegated to the Maslahat 
Council just not arbitration powers, but also supervisory powers over all three branches 
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of government. 161  By doing so, Khamenei appears to have relaxed the tight control he 
exhibited over the presidency during Khatami’s time in office.   During Khatami’s years 
in office as the president, Khamenei clearly demonstrated that if he controlled both the 
legislative and the judiciary, the executive branch could be kept in line.  However, 
Khamenei’s power is not just limited to the government; he also exercises coercive power 
over the clergy through the Special Court for Clerics.  In addition, as the Commander-in-
Chief, he controls both the conventional armed forces, and the IRGC.162  Through the 
IRGC and the AEOI he controls the nuclear program, and through the IRGC’s 
subordinate branch the Basij, as well as through the clerical commissars and the Office of 
the Supreme Leader’s connections to the intelligence services, he also exerts significant 
coercive power over the populace as well.  Furthermore, he exercises immense indirect 
control over the electoral process by having power over the Guardian Council, which 
itself pre-screens candidates for the elections and only allows those it approves of to 
compete.   And so it is that Khamenei is truly the holder of more power inside his country 
than most presidents and kings.  However, he does not have absolute power.  The 
Assembly of Experts has the function of providing oversight of the Leader and holding 
him accountable.  The Assembly, elected by a nationwide vote, initially composed of 55 
clerics and 18 non-clerics, was originally convened in August 1979 to draft a constitution 
based on Islam, that included the Mandate of the Jurist, and that was ultimately to create 
the regime of both the umma and the Imamate.163  Since that first meeting, it has grown 
to 86 clerics, and the main function has become electing the Supreme Leader and holding 
him accountable.164   
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a. Khamenei’s Political Beliefs 
Understanding Khamenei’s constitutional basis for power provides a solid 
foundation from which to address his political beliefs.  An understanding of his political 
beliefs greatly clarifies the seemingly complex nuclear issue.   A RAND study analyzed 
all of Khamenei’s speeches over a ten year period and found four common themes:   
“justice, Islam, independence, and self-sufficiency.”165  These were the goals of the 1979 
revolution, and are embodied today in the Islamic Republic of Iran.166  They are 
intertwined as well, with justice being embodied in Islam, self-sufficiency being required 
to have independence, and independence being needed in order to promote both justice 
and Islam.167  Khamenei’s position in regard to the nuclear issue is thus best viewed 
through those four themes due to Khamenei’s belief that scientific advancement will lead 
to self-sufficiency, and self-sufficiency will lead to political independence.168  An ideal 
Iran, in Khamenei’s mind, is one that “is scientifically and technologically advanced 
enough to be self-sufficient, self-sufficient enough to be economically independent, and 
economically independent enough to be politically independent.”169  He thus views the 
United States’ opposition to the Iranian nuclear program not as a proliferation matter, but 
as the United States not wanting Iran to become scientifically and technologically 
developed enough to be self-sufficient.170  As it currently stands, Iran has to import 
130,000 barrels of gasoline per day (bbl/d) in order to meet its domestic energy needs.171  
This must be quite alarming to the fourth-largest exporter of oil in the world, a country 
that exported approximately 3.9 million bbl/day of oil, or nearly 5% of the world’s 
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demand.172  When these statistics are combined with the Stanford study that predicted a 
slow decrease in Iran’s oil production beginning within the next ten years (between 
2015–2020), and with the fact that Iran receives nearly 85% of its government revenue 
from the sale of oil, then it is easy to see why Khamenei is concerned about self-
sufficiency and the need for nuclear energy.173  He is concerned about the future of his 
country from both an economic standpoint of being strategically vulnerable due to 
dependence on foreign gasoline imports, as well as a leadership standpoint of being able 
to provide for his people.  However, a compromise of allowing Iran to have nuclear 
reactors does not seem to appease him either.  He is intent on retaining the capability to 
carry out the full fuel cycle of enrichment, though he says it is both because of the 
economic benefit (which the RAND analysts do not agree with) and because he does not 
want Iran to be dependent upon foreign fuel for his nuclear reactors—the exact problem 
he is trying to avoid with gasoline.174  Based off Khamenei’s ardent beliefs in self-
sufficiency and independence, it is currently improbable that he will agree to Iran giving 
up its enrichment program because for Khamenei, self-sufficiency leads to independence, 
and the benefits of being independent far outweigh the costs.   The benefits outweigh the 
costs because Iran currently does not want to be reliant upon any foreign country for its 
needs so that no foreign country will have any sway over Iran being able to practice 
justice as embodied in Islam.   
Due to the immense and vast power that Khamenei has as the Supreme 
Leader, it was important to understand how that power was given to him, how he uses 
that power both directly and indirectly, and how his beliefs affect Iran’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons.  Yet his is not the only voice that needs analyzing.  The President is the 
second most powerful man in Iran.  Though some of the President’s powers have already 
been addressed, understanding both the constitutional basis for his power and his 
personal beliefs will shed further light on his role in Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
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2. Ahmadinejad 
According to the Constitution, the President is the second-most powerful man in 
Iran, yet has many more constraints on his power than does the Supreme Leader.  As 
head of the executive branch, the president is still subordinate to the Supreme Leader.175  
Though the President has a cabinet of 22 members that report to him, those members 
must first be approved by the Majles.176  The same constitutional changes of 1989 that 
further empowered the Supreme Leader, gave only slightly more power to the presidency 
than it previously had.  The changes gave the president the power to appoint vice-
presidents, and Ahmadinejad currently has eight.177  The President also has the power to 
appoint the provincial governors as well as ambassadors, and sets the economic policy for 
the country.178  As a result of controlling the economic policy, the president also controls 
all the state’s resources, to include the critically important oil revenues.179  In addition, 
the president also has the power to appoint numerous officials in lower ranks besides the 
governors and ambassadors, and through his power to appoint, he has tremendous power 
to shape and influence the regime’s direction.180   One of the positions that Ahmadinejad 
appoints is that of the Head of the AEOI.181  Through his ability to appoint the head of 
the AEOI and to control the budget and allocate resources to the AEOI, Ahmadinejad 
therefore has substantial power to shape the AEOI’s direction and policies as well as their 
funding.   
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His most recent appointment to head the AEOI was Abbasi Davani, sworn in as 
Vice President and Head of the AEOI on February 13, 2011.182  Davani was a survivor 
of an assassination attempt on November 29, 2010.183  His predecessor, Ali Akbar 
Salehi, was appointed by Ahmadinejad on July 17, 2009, and was a powerful figure that 
drove the AEOI to bring the first nuclear power plant online during Salehi’s tenure.184  
As a reward for his endeavors, Ahmadinejad appointed Salehi as the Foreign Minister in 
January, 2011.185  Ahmadinejad therefore set the example for Davani that to the one who 
is able to accomplish Ahmadinejad’s and the Leader’s nuclear ambitions, high rewards 
are given.  By appointing Davani, Ahmadinejad ensured that his desires for nuclear 
ambition would be in the hands of a man driven to succeed—both because of what he has 
already suffered for the cause, and because of the reward that may await him. 
While understanding Ahmadinejad’s influence over the AEOI is important, one 
must also understand what it was that brought Ahmadinejad to power.  The main element 
that brought Ahmadinejad to power was the populace’s reaction to Khatami, his 
predecessor, and Khatami’s attempted reforms.186  Ahmadinejad’s assumption of power 
should be viewed as indicative of several things. The first is that his ascension to power 
represented the ascendency of hardliners and thus the beginning of a new era in Iranian 
political history.187  The second is that Khamenei, by way of the Guardian Council and 
the Maslahat Council, had thoroughly defeated Khatami, blocked most of his attempts at 
reform, and thus left the reformist movement utterly defeated and exhausted and 
therefore did not turn out to vote.188  In essence, the voice of the Iranian people had 
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spoken—some active in that they voted for the hardliners, and some passive in that they 
simply gave up and did not vote, and the assumption of power by the hardliners 
represented a vote for a more aggressive nuclear program and return to the revolutionary 
ideals. 
Just as understanding Khamenei’s power was important in understanding his 
impact on the nuclear weapons issue, so it is important to understand Ahmadinejad as a 
person in order to assess his impact on the nuclear weapons program.   Ahmadinejad first 
became involved in the Iranian revolution as part of the Hojjatiyya, which was, “a 
militant group devoted to the Hidden Imam that was disbanded by Khomeini’s order.”189  
Though there is some disagreement as to what exactly the Hojjatiyya believe, 
Ahmadinejad made it clear in a speech shortly after his inauguration that he himself 
believed that the mission of the revolution was to, “pave the way for the reappearance of 
the Mahdi.  Today, we should define our economic, cultural and political policies on the 
basis of the Mahdi’s return.”190  In addition, early in his first term, his administration 
allocated the equivalent of $17 million dollars to build a mosque at the Jamkaran site near 
Qum where the well that the 12th Imam is believed to have disappeared down is 
located.191  He is also rumored to have thrown down the names of his nominated cabinet 
members down the well before the Majles voted on them.192  These beliefs of his are 
rather extreme—extreme because while nearly all Shias believe in the return of the 12th 
Imam, hardly anyone acts on it quite like Ahmadinejad does—and his actions thus 
illustrate that he views all of life through the lens of his strong faith.   
These religious views also are what likely caused his subservient behavior to 
Khamenei when Ahmadinejad was first inaugurated.  During the inauguration ceremony, 
Ahmadinejad kissed Khameini’s hand—something no other president had ever done.  
This was a symbolic act that displayed for the whole country that Ahmadinejad clearly 
did not see himself equal to Khameini, and actually saw himself quite below him.  Part of 
                                                 





this is because Ahmadinejad is the first Iranian President since 1981 that is not a cleric.  
Therefore, in a country that is founded upon the idea that the Supreme Jurist serves with 
the same authority as the Imams, it is no wonder that a man with such strong religious 
beliefs but with no actual clerical training would therefore venerate the Supreme Leader.   
Yet Ahmadinejad’s behavior has sometimes seemed to indicate disagreements 
with the Supreme Leader.  Evidence of possible disagreements between Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad began to surface as early as January 2008.  An aide to Khamenei reportedly 
said that Khamenei was disappointed in Ahmadinejad’s economic policy’s 
performance.193  In addition, after Ahmadinejad fired Mohammad Zolghadr as the 
deputy interior minister for security affairs, Khamenei appointed Zolghadr as the deputy 
head of the Basij.194  In a sign that Ahmadinejad is also bothered by the power that 
Khamenei and his personal advisors wield, Ahmadinejad was angered when Ali Larijani, 
Khamenei’s personal representative at the Supreme National Security Council, visited 
Egypt.195 Apparently Ahmadinejad resented that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was not 
the one making the trip, which meant that Khamenei cut Ahmadinejad out of that 
particular international equation.   
Another example of disagreements between the two includes the time when 
Khamenei had to reprimand Ahmadinejad over the UNSCR sanctions.  Upon learning of 
the sanctions, Ahmadinejad reportedly said that the sanctions were just scraps of 
paper.196  Khamenei disagreed and gave him a mild rebuke over the issue.197 
More recently, in April 2011, Ahmadinejad and Khamenei disagreed over 
Ahmadinejad’s firing of his Intelligence Minister, Heydar Moslehi.  Ahmadinejad’s 
closest advisor, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, originally pushed for Moslehi’s firing by 
accusing him of not providing good intelligence and analysis regarding recent regional 
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events.198  Reportedly Moslehi attempted to fire a senior intelligence official with whom 
Mashaei had close ties.199  Instead, Mashaei persuaded Ahmadinejad to fire Moslehi.  
Uncertainty reigned for three days until Khamenei published a letter in every major 
Iranian media outlet that told Moslehi and his officers to return to work.  Like a sullen 
child, Ahmadinejad decided not to come to work for eight days, in protest to Khamenei’s 
decision.  He returned to work quite quickly however, when Khamenei asked a 
conservative lawmaker to begin assembling a caretaker Cabinet in case Ahmadinajad 
needed to resign or be removed.200 
Ahmadinejad then decided that he needed to reassert his power, so on May 14, 
2011, he fired the Oil Minister and announced that he would serve as the interim head of 
the Oil Ministry—a move which would also allow him to chair the next OPEC meeting, 
scheduled for the summer of 2011, and thus give him a much-needed public-image 
boost.201  The Guardian Council quickly declared that move unconstitutional and lacking 
Parliamentary support.  That was followed by Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani 
calling on Ahmadinejad to name a new Oil Minister by June 8, 2011, which did not 
occur.202     
Additionally, on May 25, 2011, the Parliament began an investigation into alleged 
misuse of state funds by Ahmadinejad.  Allegedly Ahmadinejad bribed 9 million people 
by giving each person $80 before the 2009 Presidential election. 203  Giving 9 million 
people $80 before a vote is not an act taken in secret.  The timing of this investigation, 
coming on the heels of the confrontation over the Minister of Intelligence, as well as the 
                                                 
198 Thomas Erdbrink, “Iranian leader rebuffs Ahmadinejad over official’s dismissal,” The Washington 
Post, April 20, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranian-leader-rebuffs-ahmadinejad-over-
officials-dismissal/2011/04/20/AFwFttDE_story.html, accessed 21 April 2011. 
199 Ibid. 
200 “The Iranian Power Struggle and its Implications for the Nuclear Crisis,” ISIS, June 2, 2011, 
http://www.isisnucleariran.org/briefs/detail/the-iranian-power-struggle-and-its-implications-for-the-
nuclear-crisis/ accessed June 6, 2011. 
201 Robert Tait, “Ahmadinejad and Larijani Tussle In An Oil Slick,” Radio Free Europe, May 27, 
2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/ahmidinejad_and_larijani_tussle_in_an_oil_slick/24207146.html, 
accessed Juen 16, 2011.   
202 “The Iranian Power Struggle and its Implications for the Nuclear Crisis,” ISIS. 
203 Tait, Radio Free Europe. 
 43 
Oil Minister, indicates that the tide has turned against Ahmadinejad and his formerly 
widespread support is now wearing thin.   
When viewed from the perspectives of his constitutional empowerments, his 
influence over the nuclear weapons program via the AEOI, and his strong faith and initial 
subservience to the Supreme Leader, it is apparent the Ahmadinejad is not just a willing 
supporter of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, but an ardent proponent.  He is also 
representative of the hardliners who seek a more aggressive role for themselves and see 
the development of nuclear weapons as a method to gain more power and credibility for 
themselves.  However, recently fractures have appeared in the relationship between the 
Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.  While Ahmadinejad has been a powerful personality in the 
nuclear issue, it was only because he was serving to advance Khamenei’s interests.  With 
the recent souring of that relationship, Ahmadinejad may not serve as important a role in 
the nuclear issue.  The groups that Ahmadinejad has influence other, specifically those 
organizations he can empower through his constitutional powers, will still remain 
important organizations in the nuclear weapons program.  However, those organizations 
have not been discussed yet and therefore the focus now turns to the Atomic Energy 
Organization, the IRGC, and the Supreme National Security Council.  
D. ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Atomic Energy Organization 
The next step in this analysis is to look at the four most important groups that are 
involved in the nuclear weapons program:  the Atomic Energy Organization, the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Supreme National Security Council.  The AEOI’s 
predominant interest lies in the scientific and technical aspects of the nuclear program, 
the IRGC is predominantly interested in the security side of the program, and the 
Supreme National Security Council’s predominant interest is in the national security of 
Iran.204  Since Khamenei wants self-sufficiency and independence, the AEOI is the 
organization he is most reliant on to make that happen.  It also means that the AEOI is the 
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organization that will be most affected by any suspension of enrichment—one of the 
main sticking points of the numerous UN sanctions.  From an administrative aspect, if the 
AEOI were to suspend enrichment, it would result in lost jobs for numerous scientists, as 
well as negatively impact retaining other scientists.205  In addition, one expert estimated 
it could result in as much as, “$5 billion lost and the failure of fifteen years of effort.”206  
From the technical perspective, scientists argue that suspending one of the five phases of 
nuclear fuel production will render the other phases ineffective.207  And the AEOI is not 
content to just point out the scientific drawbacks to a suspension either.  The AEOI is 
also known to argue ardently about the dangers of being reliant upon other countries for 
their nuclear fuel.208  Regardless, from the arguments the advocates of the AEOI put 
forth, it is apparent that they are solely focused on their own self-interests—which is why 
they argue so ardently in support of the program.  
2. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
However, the AEOI is not the only organization pressing for nuclear weapons.  
As the Guardians of the Revolution, the IRGC is entrusted with both the missile forces as 
well as the actual nuclear installations.209  They alone owe their loyalty to the regime 
since they exist solely to protect the regime, and so those two most important facets of 
Iranian security are entrusted to those whom the regime trusts the most.  While not many 
details of IRGC support for the nuclear program are known, however the IRGC is known 
to support technology that either equalizes an opponent’s advantage, or that allows a 
military shortcut.210  In addition, when looking at what the IRGC is tasked with as an 
organization (the defense of the revolution), nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor 
of both security and power.211 When looking at their organizational history, nuclear 
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weapons also make sense when one takes into account the tremendous casualties and 
massive suffering inflicted on them from chemical weapons and ballistic missiles during 
the Iran-Iraq war.212  When a person or an organization has been beaten badly, as the 
IRGC and Iranian military were by Iraq and Saddam’s use of chemical weapons in the 
later stages of the Iran-Iraq war, it is only natural to want to retaliate, or at least have the 
option to retaliate, in the same manner or worse.  When the IRGC’s control of the missile 
forces is evaluated in this argument, once again nuclear weapons make sense because the 
nuclear warheads would be joined to the missiles which would allow the IRGC to deter 
attacks against Iran, project their power (regionally with the missiles, globally if 
delivering a nuclear warhead in a non-typical method or if they develop an 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)), and enhance their prestige in comparison to 
the conventional armed forces.213  Thus it is safe to say that the IRGC is in support of the 
nuclear program, and since they are in control of both the ballistic missiles and the 
nuclear facilities, they will most likely be entrusted with deploying the nuclear weapons, 
should they obtain them. 
3. Supreme National Security Council 
The next group that requires evaluation is the Supreme National Security Council, 
where all major national security issues are decided214.  The President is the chair of the 
Council, while the Secretary of the Council is roughly equivalent to the U.S. National 
Security Advisor.215  There is a representative of the Supreme Leader in the Council, as 
well as the Defense Minister, the Commander of the IRGC (whom the Supreme Leader 
appoints), the Foreign Minister, the Maslahat Council President, as well as several others, 
to include the Head of the AEOI on occasion.216  In addition, the Supreme Leader has his 
own board of advisors whom he may consult on national security matters if those 
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advisors are not present in the Supreme National Security Council.  Regardless, the 
composition of the Council also happens to be a broad representation of the elite as well, 
who often have as much informal power as they do formal power.217  Therefore both the 
formal and informal power structures encourage a consensus-based, decision-making 
process, which then implies that everyone is behind the decision, and thus all are in it 
together.218  This serves the added advantage of “closing the gaps” so that foreign 
powers cannot exploit any differences that might exist otherwise.219  The Supreme 
Leader is the final decision-maker, but instead of charting the course and basing decisions 
off a desired end-state, he instead seems to balance factional demands.220  Though he has 
immense power, he is more concerned domestically with maintaining the status quo, 
which results in playing sides off one another with a bias towards the hardliners, and does 
not provide much visionary leadership.221  As a result, Iranian foreign policy appears 
largely incoherent to the outsider, while the insiders on the Council have the code that 
unlocks the motives behind Iran’s sometimes contradictory stances.222   
Inside the Council, the AEOI voices strong support for the nuclear program and 
can provide input  into the technical aspects of the program, highlight the valuable 
knowledge and experience already gained, and emphasize the negative impact that a long 
suspension of activities would have on both the retention of qualified scientists and their 
morale.223  The Foreign Minister and the Council Secretary can provide insight into the 
diplomatic impact that continual pursuit of the nuclear program will have on relations 
with Europe, and the IAEA, as well as remind the Council of international obligations 
and by doing so, craft a better diplomatic strategy.224   
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This is why Khamenei’s and Khatami’s decision to emplace Ruhani as the Council 
Secretary in 2003 was so important—it reflected the then pragmatic approach that the 
two most important leaders in Iran wanted to take regarding the nuclear program.  
Likewise, that is why the hardliner’s ascendency to power in the 2004 elections proved to 
be a change from this pragmatic position.  The hardliners replaced many of the 
pragmatists in the key governmental posts, and Khamenei, seeing “the will of the 
people,” saw his opportunity and replaced pragmatic Ruhani with Larijani.  The Foreign 
Minister and Defense Minister also changed, and thus since the 2004 elections, the 
Council has been dominated by conservatives, the IRGC, and the AEOI.  As a result of 
the hardliners’ support of the nuclear program, as well as the IRGC’s support and the 
AEOI’s support, and the momentum the nuclear program currently has, the costs of 
reversing or freezing any part of the program are likely to greatly outweigh the benefits 
of continuing, and therefore it is not likely that Iran will agree to suspend enrichment, let 
alone to agree to give it up entirely. 
4. Majles 
The final group to evaluate is that Majles.  The President has no constitutional 
power over the Majles, though historically if the President is popular, the Majles supports 
the President.  The role of the Majles in the nuclear program historically was not one of 
day-to-day importance; however in 2004 the conservatives gained power in the Majles.  
Of the 152 new Parliamentarians elected in 2004, 91 were former IRGC members in the 
past, and another 34 former IRGC officers were in senior-level posts in the 
government.225 As such, the Majles has become more of a conservative-dominated 
mouthpiece of the people that serves to send messages to Khamenei and the leadership.  
These messages include the idea that the people (and the hardliners and conservatives) 
are either tired of negotiations, as in 2004; or tired of the delay in resuming the nuclear 
program, as in 2005; or that the Majles and the people were angry at how Iran was being 
treated by the IAEA, as in 2006.  None of the bills the Majles passed on each of those 
occasions resulted or obligated the government to actually do anything, and therefore the 
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role of Majles has just been to send messages to the leadership.  It is important to note 
however, that parliamentarian candidates are vetted by the Guardian Council before even 
being allowed to run.  As a result, the Majles is not an accurate mouthpiece of the 
people—it is a mouthpiece of those the regime deems safe enough to be the “elected 
leaders” of the people.  So just because the Majles passes a bill does not mean the bill has 
the full support of the people of Iran, nor does it mean that the bill has even the full 
support of the Majles and therefore of the people.  A bill’s passing more often means just 
that on the day the bill was voted on, the majority of the parliamentarians present 
supported the bill.   
Since Ali Larijani became Speaker of the Majles in 2009 and instituted 
Parliamentary oversight of the nuclear negotiations, however, a new trend may have 
begun:  Parliamentary Oversight.  It will remain to be seen however, just how much 
“Parliamentary” oversight the Majles exercises.  Will it be true oversight whereby 
Parliament does not allow any nuclear negotiations to go forward unless those 
negotiations are within the framework established by the Parliament?  Or was that speech 
just a cover for Khamenei and Larijani to consolidate more power within the Supreme 
Leader’s hands or further restrain Ahmadinejad’s power?  Regardless, the recent 
confrontations between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei seem to indicate to Larijani and the 
Majles that Ahmadinejad’s long-standing support may be coming to an end.  The Majles 
may serve an indirect role in the nuclear weapons issue if it serves to impeach 
Ahmadinejad and cause early elections. 
 49 
III. DETERRENCE MODELS 
After determining the role of the two men and four organizations most important 
to the nuclear weapons program and how they exercise power directly and indirectly, the 
key question becomes, “which deterrence theory or blend of theories most closely 
matches the observed behavior?”  According to Classical Realism theory, the two most 
dominate actions a state can pursue are increasing its own security and increasing its own 
power.226  Khamenei’s desire for the independence that comes from self-sufficiency is 
best interpreted as Khamenei not wanting his country to be strategically vulnerable.  As 
such, he is ultimately concerned with Iran’s security and, therefore, a nuclear energy 
program in which Iran is able to produce its own fuel will help Iran become more secure.  
In addition, according to the February 25, 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency 
report on Iran’s nuclear program, work seemingly continues on nuclear weapons-type 
research,  and since Khamenei has not stopped such work, it is safe to assume that he 
likewise desires nuclear weapons—or the ability to produce one quickly, if needed.227  
This is best interpreted as Khamenei viewing nuclear weapons as a way to increase both 
Iran’s power and its security.   
Classical Realism further postulates that states are rational actors.228  The 
Rational Actor theory says that states behave in a rational way, meaning their actions are 
best explained by showing that the benefits outweighed the costs of the actions they 
undertook.  229  Khamenei’s desire for independence and therefore self-sufficiency show 
that he values these two ideals far above almost everything else.  In addition, given his 
immense power, most subordinates likewise “want what the boss wants.”  Given that the 
consensus-making that occurs in the Supreme National Security Council is designed to 
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prevent foreign powers from exploiting perceived rifts within Iran’s government, Iran’s 
behavior is best viewed as “Unitary.”  From 2003–2004, the time period after President 
Bush gave his “Axis of Evil” speech and after the first UNSCR went into effect, 
Khamenei and Khatami were willing to negotiate with the U.S. in a “grand bargain” that 
included offers on Iran’s participation in Iraq, Iran’s nuclear program, and Iran’s support 
to both Hamas and Hezbollah.230  This offer shows that when the threat is strong enough 
and credible enough, it affects Khamenei’s perceptions of his costs and benefits, with the 
result being that Khamenei is willing to negotiate. 
However there are several instances in Iran’s nuclear history and its history in 
general that illustrate that Iran might not always behave rationally.  From Iran’s nuclear 
history, it could be argued that Iran was irrational when it did not ratify the agreement 
reached on the Paris Negotiations in late 2004, which offered membership in the World 
Trade Organization, among other incentives, if Iran simply stopped enriching uranium.  
Likewise, it could be argued that in 2006 Iran again was irrational when it did not accept 
the package of incentives from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council 
to halt enrichment.  The critique to both these arguments though is difficult to argue.  The 
critique is that since Iran did not ratify the Paris Negotiations or accept the package of 
incentives, then Iran must have simply viewed the long-term benefits of continued 
uranium enrichment as outweighing the short-term costs it would incur by doing so.  The 
problem with this critique is that it assumes rationality as the foundation for its argument 
and thus uses circular logic to prove its point.  In actuality, the reason why Iran may not 
have accepted the incentives might be because the internal debate took too long to gain 
consensus.  This would then imply that Iran is not fully unitary, and the costs and benefits 
of a particular action or decision might not be the same for the different groups or 
individuals that comprise the government.  Furthermore, in 2003 after Bush made his 
“Axis of Evil” speech and invaded Iraq, Khamenei and Khatami ordered the enrichment 
program suspended in order to facilitate Ruhani’s negotiations with the EU-3, but in 2004 
the conservatives swept into power in the Parliament and started threatening to pass a bill 
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obligating Iran to resume its enrichment program.  While this does not confirm or deny 
rationality, it does indicate both a lack of unity once more, as well as a disagreement 
amongst the leadership as to the costs and benefits of uranium enrichment and 
negotiations. 
Another problem with trying to define Iran’s behavior as rational or irrational is 
that they likely weight the costs and benefits differently than we do.  As such, any 
attempt to define their behavior based of rationality may be based on a potentially flawed 
understanding of how they view the costs and benefits of each action.  As a result of this 
and the examples provided, the Unitary and Rational Actor theory does not provide a 
sufficient explanation of Iran’s behavior.   
There is greater explanatory power though, when Unitary and Rational Actor 
theory is paired with both Organizational Process and Governmental Politics theories.  
The Organizational Process theory says that a government is essentially nothing more 
than a conglomeration of organizations.231 The way to explain a government’s behavior 
is to understand that behavior as the output of the standard operating procedures and 
interests of the organizations that comprise the government.232  Under this theory, the 
output/government behavior that is produced usually looks like the output of those 
organizations that are strongest in the government.233  Thus Iran’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons can be interpreted as the obvious output for Iran based off the strong role that 
the conservatives played in the Parliament, as well as the role the AEOI and the IRGC 
play in the issue.  Pursuing the development of nuclear weapons is something that the 
AEOI has had a special research unit for since the mid-1970s, while pursuing nuclear 
energy is explicitly why the AEOI was first created.  The main sticking point the West 
has with Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is that Iran is also enriching uranium far beyond 
what a peaceful program needs.   Therefore the West demands a complete halt to all 
enrichment.   The problem for the AEOI lies in the fact that Iran cannot completely halt 
the enrichment process without also halting the research and enrichment that is occurring 
                                                 




for the peaceful energy purposes.  Admittedly, there is no known peaceful purpose for 
enriching uranium beyond the 20% threshold.  Also research into the development of 
nuclear weapons is not routine; however, it is in the interests of the AEOI since they have 
a history of having a special unit devoted to developing a nuclear weapon, so this 
behavior is explainable because it is in the interests of the AEOI.  As a result, continual 
pursuit of nuclear energy and uranium enrichment are the obvious choices for the AEOI 
to support because both are what they were designed for in the first place and it best 
serves their own interests.  This is in keeping with the predictions of this theory in the 
first chapter.  Additionally, since the leadership of the AEOI is a Vice Presidential 
position, it has a powerful voice that it can use to express its opinion in the nuclear debate 
inside the Supreme National Security Council both directly, when asked to attend, and 
indirectly through Ahmadinejad, its biggest supporter.  
Likewise the standard organizational output of the IRGC is defense of the 
revolution, meaning the regime.  Any organization that is tasked with defending 
something will naturally want the best weapons and best training in order to provide the 
best defense.  So it is with the IRGC.  It is already entrusted with the ballistic missile 
forces and the nuclear installations, as well as its own navy component, air force 
component, intelligence component, unconventional warfare component (Quds Force), 
paramilitary component, and even an economic enterprise component.234  It also has a 
history of looking for “game-changing” weapons and technology to continue 
strengthening itself.  The only thing it does not have—and some of its enemies do have—
is nuclear weapons.  Therefore it is only natural for the IRGC to pursue the development 
of nuclear weapons, as was predicted in the first chapter.  Given that it controls over 1/3 
of Iran’s economy directly and 2/3s indirectly, and given that numerous leaders within 
the government and the executive branch in particular are IRGC veterans from the Iran-
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Iraq war, then the IRGC also has substantial formal and informal power channels to both 
support and push for support for pursuing nuclear weapons.235   
The Supreme National Security Council is another venue for the hardliners to use 
their informal and former power channels to support the development of nuclear 
weapons.  Since the mission of the Council is to decide upon national security matters, it 
is safe to say that the members of the Council look to keep Iran secure, for it is in both 
their own individual interest as well as the Council’s interests.  Since nuclear weapons 
are the most powerful weapons possible, the Organizational Process model easily 
explains why the Council would support the development or pursuit of nuclear weapons.   
The Majles also supports the development of nuclear weapons.  Of the current 
members, 195 of the 290 members are conservatives. 236  Since conservatives support the 
nuclear program, then the conservatives dominate the legislative schedule and are able to 
create and pass bills to ensure that the Supreme Leader knows the will of the people (or at 
least of the conservatives).  As a result, the Organizational Process model easily explains 
the parliamentary support for the nuclear program, because the parliament is dominated 
by the group who most supports the nuclear program.  As a result, the Organizational 
Process model provides more explanatory power than just Unitary, Rational Actor theory, 
yet still it too is not able to explain everything.   
One problem is that the groups, whose routines and interests supposedly 
determine the actions of the government, are composed of individuals with their own 
agendas.  Sometimes those agendas might not synchronize well with the overall goals of 
the group.  This becomes a problem when the most powerful person in the group begins 
to sway the group in order to accomplish his agenda, and opponents of that agenda inside 
the group lack sufficient power to prevent the group from following the individual’s 
agenda.  For instance, while the pursuit of nuclear energy is in the best interests of the 
AEOI, research into the development of nuclear weapons might not be in the group’s best 
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interests because it may ultimately serve to bring unwanted international attention upon 
the group, resulting in the AEOI’s demise.  However, conducting research into the 
development of nuclear weapons might be in the best interests of the President of the 
AEOI, because if the AEOI is able to develop a nuclear weapon under his leadership, 
then he will likely be richly rewarded by President Ahmadinejad, as the former head of 
the AEOI was.  In order to evaluate this individual-level bargaining and its impact on a 
nation’s actions, the Governmental Politics theory is needed. 
The Governmental Politics theory further elucidates Iran’s reasons for pursuing 
nuclear weapons.  This theory says that government action is a political result based off 
of bargaining amongst the key participants.237  Khamenei enjoys vast power as Supreme 
Leader, but he leaves most of the day-to-day operations of the government in the hands of 
his subordinates so that he can gain objectivity over the debates between the pragmatists 
and the hardliners on the Supreme National Security Council.  As Commander-in-Chief, 
the Supreme National Security Council provides him expert advice and recommendations 
on matters of national security.  However, the members of the Council work quite hard at 
reaching a consensus before they undertake any action or recommend any action to 
Khamenei. This consensus-making that occurs often involves political bargaining by each 
side in order to arrive at a decision or recommendation that all members agree to.  
Although the President of the AEOI and the Commander of the IRGC are ardent 
supporters of the nuclear weapons program, the Council must still listen to all parties 
concerned in order to arrive at a decision that is amenable to all, and thus amenable to the 
Supreme Leader.  So Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons can also be interpreted through 
the lens of bargaining and consensus-making that occurs amongst the members of the 
Supreme National Security Council, which is predicted by the Governmental Politics 
model. 
The major flaw in the Governmental Politics model is the lack of knowledge as to 
what exactly is discussed within the Supreme National Security Council meetings.  
Without knowing who attended the meetings and without knowing what was discussed 
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and agreed to at each meeting, it is impossible to prove conclusively that Iran’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons is the direct result of bargaining that occurs between the major players.  
Furthermore, it is difficult to say that the development of nuclear weapons was driven by 
political bargaining when the nuclear weapons have not yet been developed.  Therefore it 
is impossible to assess the predictive usefulness of this theory since none of the 
predictions of individual and group benefits have yet to materialize due to the lack of 
successful development of nuclear weapons. 
While Realism provides decent explanatory power of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons, Liberalism, or more specifically Neo-Liberal Institutionalism, does not.  Neo-
Liberal Institutionalism asks why states cooperate.238  Ultimately, they argue, the reason 
states cooperate is because each is better off cooperating with the other given that the 
states in question will continue to interact with each other indefinitely.239  The main 
critique of this theory, when applying it to Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is quite 
simply that the U.S. and Iran have not decided to cooperate yet, even though it is clearly 
in each other’s best interests.  Indeed, although there have been multiple opportunities to 
do so, ranging from Khatami’s “grand bargain” in 2003 to President Clinton’s 1998 
overtures and Secretary Albright’s remarks, they have all been misunderstood.240  
Regardless, the two states have not yet cooperated on this issue, and therefore Neo-
Liberal Institutionalism provides does not help in explaining Iran’s behavior. 
This analysis began by delineating the history of Iran’s nuclear program with the 
goal of identifying the most important entities that are involved in the nuclear weapons 
program.  While arguments could be made for a more exhaustive list of the individuals 
involved, the two most important were highlighted.  Reviewing Khamenei’s elaborate 
formal and informal, direct and indirect power channels and structures proved 
enlightening in understanding just how powerful he is and why he is the ultimate 
decision-maker.  Knowing his political beliefs and his views on the strategic vulnerability 
of Iran in its reliance upon foreign powers for both gasoline and nuclear fuel sheds 
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tremendous light on Iran’s recalcitrance to halt uranium enrichment.  It also helps prove 
the idea that Classical Realism is the best perspective through which to view Iran’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons.  However, understanding Ahmadinejad’s role in the program 
by both being a vocal supporter of it in the Supreme National Security Council, as well as 
by appointing the head of the AEOI and funding the AEOI, is important in understanding 
what his powers are, and what his powers are not.  It is also useful in that it provides 
evidence that Governmental Politics Theory provides additional explanatory power in 
explaining Iran’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons.  Knowing the roles of the AEOI, 
the IRGC, and the Supreme National Security Council is important because knowledge of 
those organizations and their interests shed light on how Khamenei is influenced to make 
decisions.  It also helps explain why his decisions are often made as a result of domestic 
politics rather than an overarching strategic plan and therefore why Governmental 
Politics provides additional insight into Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.  Khamenei’s 
overarching role in both Iran in general, and the nuclear program and nuclear weapons 
program specifically, indicate that Unitary, Rational Actor Theory provides sufficient 
explanatory power; however, including both Organizational Process and Government 
Politics Theories provides a more robust explanatory foundation for the development of 
an effective deterrence strategy. 
This ultimately means that no one single theory of deterrence accurately describes 
Iran and Iran’s behavior.  As a result, any deterrence strategy that is founded upon only 
one deterrence theory is going to fail.  Complex problems, such as deterring Iran from 
pursuing nuclear weapons, have complex solutions, not simple one-theory solutions.  Iran 
is best viewed through a combination of lenses because the key individuals who hold 
sway over the most important groups are rational and those individuals undertake actions 
that are best for them, their groups, and Iran.   
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Since there is no one particular deterrence lens that best describes Iran, then 
multiple lenses must be involved in the formulation of a good deterrence strategy, 
specifically Rational Actor, Organizational Process, and Government Politics models.   
This strategy should therefore include measures directed against each level discussed:  
the Supreme Leader, the President, the AEOI, the IRGC, the Supreme National Security 
Council and the Majles.  In the book, Which Path to Persia?, the authors explain the nine 
possible policy options to use against Iran, encompassed under four broad categories:  
The Diplomatic Options that include the approaches of Persuasion and Engagement; the 
Military Options that include the approaches of Invasion, Airstrikes, and Allowing an 
Israeli Strike; the Regime Change Options that include Supporting a Popular Uprising 
(Velvet Revolution), Inspiring an Insurgency using the minority and opposition groups, 
and the Coup approach in which the U.S. would support a military move against the 
regime; and the final possible approach is Containment, which is the fall-back plan in 
case the other approaches do not work.241  While this book was the definitive work on 
the subject when it was published in 2009, much has changed in the two and half years 
since its publication.  The policy options have not changed significantly, but the 
international situation has and thus has made the Persuasion option the most likely to 
succeed.  As such, this chapter will not set forth a new policy option, but instead will 
explain and expand upon the Persuasion option explained in the book and integrate the 
Regime Change options as well in order to try to fix specific benefits and specific costs to 
each of the individuals and groups identified as being most important to the nuclear 
weapons issue earlier for the purpose of trying to convince Iran to change its behavior. 
A. PERSUASION OPTION 
The Persuasion Option is easily understandable in terms of costs and benefits.  
This option seeks to increase Iran’s costs for pursuing nuclear weapons and enriching 
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uranium, as well as increase the benefits of Iran halting the same behavior.  The U.S. 
must use the UN Security Council to get Iran to halt its behavior because after 30 years of 
sanctions against Iran, the U.S. has very few remaining ties that it can threaten to cut, 
which is the traditional method of signaling to another country that its behavior will not 
be tolerated.242  The main problem inhibiting the imposition of strong sanctions against 
Iran has been Russia and China watering the sanctions down in the UN Security Council.  
This has allowed Iran to escape the most damaging sanctions so far.  The two main 
reasons for both countries watering down the sanctions is both because it is in each 
country’s interests to do so, and because neither country believes that the U.S. has been 
serious about offering substantial incentives to Iran.243  As a result, when threatened with 
sanctions, Iran has come to rely on both countries and pander to their needs in order to 
persuade them to water down the sanctions.  The new strategy should ensure that the 
members of the UN Security Council agree upon the costs and benefits before either are 
offered or threatened.244  In particular, if both Russia and China agree to the sanctions 
and benefits ahead of time though, and the sanctions are written into the UN Security 
Council resolutions that are demanding the halt of Iran’s behavior, then it will serve as a 
signal to Iran that its benefactors are no longer going to shield it from the coercive 
treatment of the West, and it will make it much more difficult for Iran to escape the 
sanctions.245  There are several recommendations provided later in the chapter that 
provide details on how to entice Russia and China away from Iran. 
In addition, there need to be specific triggers tied to the sanctions so that Iran 
knows very clearly what to expect if it undertakes an action that is not approve by the UN 
Security Council.246  Those triggers should include Iran’s withdrawal from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (this could be an indication of Iran attempting a “breakout” 
development of nuclear weapons), and Iranian unwillingness to sign the additional 
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protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (this protocol provides for much tougher and 
invasive inspections).247  The triggers should also include any additional enrichment of 
Iran’s low-enriched uranium (LEU) beyond the 20% threshold, and any failure on Iran’s 
part to convert its current stocks of LEU into fuel rods for the nuclear reactors.248  The 
final trigger should be Iran’s failure to change the storage site of its LEU from next to the 
centrifuge cascades (where it could be quickly enriched to the level needed for weapons), 
to a storage facility located in a different area and away from its centrifuge plants.249   
The last key factor for this strategy is timing:  when should the costs and benefits 
be presented to Iran, and how should they be presented—publically or secretly?  The last 
ten years have seen several very favorable events happen for Iran, most notably the 
overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, and of the Ba’ath Regime and Saddam Hussein in 
2003.  However, a number of bad events have also occurred that may have placed the 
Supreme Leader of Iran into a losses mindset.  The “losses mindset” is best described as 
how people are not as willing to take a risk in order to make a gain as they are in order to 
prevent a loss.250  These events include the public rift that is currently occurring between 
Khamenei and Ahmadinejad in which Khamenei has issued a thinly-veiled threat to 
eliminate the position of the Presidency.251  There is also the pressure of the UNSCR 
sanctions and the U.S. unilateral sanctions that are weighing down the Iranian economy 
and are greatly hindering foreign investment, the ability of Iran to repair and upgrade its 
oil refineries, and its ability to procure necessary technology. On top of that, Iran is still 
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struggling with a 14.6% unemployment rate.252   Then there is the problem of the 
Stuxnet virus.  The virus has allegedly destroyed over 1,000 IR-I type centrifuges, which 
is approximately 10% of its enrichment capability.253  This caused Iran to shut down the 
enrichment program for months before they were able to determine the cause of the 
problem.254  In addition, the recent move of Khaled Meshaal, the leader of Hamas, from 
Syria to Egypt was also detrimental to Iran.255  Meshaal had to leave Syria because Iran 
was pressuring him and Hamas to support Assad’s government even though the 
government was attacking the Muslim Brotherhood who were kinsmen of Meshaal’s.256  
As a result, Meshaal chose not to take sides and instead opened talks with the Egyptian 
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.257  He was allowed to move back to Egypt but under 
the terms of having to reconcile with Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Prime Minister, 
and acquiescence to the prisoner-swap deal involving the captured Israeli soldier, Gilad 
Shalit.258  This move served as another blow to Iran’s regional influence as it moved one 
of Iran’s main proxies for interfering with the Middle East Peace process out of Syria 
where Iran had excellent access, and into Egypt—one of Iran’s regional rivals.  Another 
blow to Iran’s regional prestige occurred in 2009—and is still simmering below the 
surface—when hundreds of thousands of people across Iran protested the Presidential 
elections.  A significant blow to Khamenei personally came when he issued a religious 
decree for everyone to return to their homes—and no one obeyed.  He had to resort to 
using the Basij and the IRGC to restore order. 
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In addition to Iran’s economic problems, unemployment problems, nuclear 
program problems, and international-terrorist-groups-defecting-to-the-other-side 
problems, Iran is also facing smoldering ethnic-minority unrest.  Pejak, the militant wing 
of the Kurdish separatist group the PKK (or Kurdistan Workers’ Party) has been 
conducting attacks along the Turkish border, while the Balochi terrorist group Jundallah 
has been conducting attacks in the southeast province of Baluchistan.259  All of the above 
sets the stage for interpreting Khamenei’s behavior through the lens of him being in a 
“losses mindset” and therefore risk-tolerant.  As such, when an opponent is in a losses 
mindset, one should lay out the deterrence strategy in “gains” terms.260  This means that 
the way the proposed deterrence strategy should be presented to Iran is to only present 
the incentives to Iran, and allow them to find out about the disincentives and sanctions 
through their own channels.  Additionally, the incentives should be played up, while the 
sanctions and disincentives should be played down.261  Furthermore, however the 
Administration wishes to present it—either to the Iranian people publically, or to the 
Iranian leadership privately—care should be taken to emphasize the benefits to the 
audience that is receiving the message, and care should be taken to downplay the threats.  
If it is presented to the people publically, it will only be seen as reinforcing each 
individual’s already determined viewpoint.  This may serve to galvanize the pragmatists 
and reformers, which may cause the hardliners, who are the ones in power, to feel 
threatened and not take the offer.  As a result, if the Administration and the UNSC truly 
want Iran to accept the deal, then they should present the deal to the Iranian leadership 
privately, but with the understanding that if the leadership does not provide an answer 
within a certain timeframe, then the UNSC will go public with the details.262    
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Now that the Persuasion Option has been defined, it is time to elaborate on the 
incentives/benefits and the disincentives/costs and benefits that should be proposed to 
Iran.  There are four main categories that the proposed incentives fall into:  Nuclear 
Energy, Economic Inducements, Security Guarantees, and Political Incentives.263     
B. INCENTIVES 
1. Nuclear Energy 
When discussing nuclear energy, the incentives should include the already-
proposed light-water reactors, as well as in the short-run there should be a commitment 
from another country to provide nuclear fuel to Iran.264  In the long run, due to counter-
proliferation fears, the U.S. should take the lead in developing an international 
framework for civilian nuclear energy cooperation.265  This should ultimately result in an 
organization, located within the United Nations bureaucracy, which is responsible for 
overseeing and supervising a program whereby those countries that want nuclear energy 
programs are able to obtain advice, assistance, and both the provision of nuclear fuel and 
the disposal of spent nuclear fuel, for developing a safe and peaceful nuclear energy 
program.  This program would likely rely on light-water reactors since the spent nuclear 
fuel they generate is harder to quickly convert to fissile material, and because those types 
of reactors are generally much easier to monitor.266  These are the same reasons why the 
light-water reactors should once again be offered to Iran.  Additionally, in the proposal to 
Iran, there should be a stipulation that the spent fuel is returned to the providing country 
so that the Iranians would not be able to use the fuel to make into a bomb, much as the 
Iranians have with Russia regarding the fuel at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.267 
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2. Economic Inducements 
Since Iran’s economy is currently in tough times, economic inducements are an 
essential element of the new strategy.  The Bush Administration offered Iran membership 
into the World Trade Organization, the resumption of Iran’s pre-sanctions trade with both 
Japan and Europe, and the lifting of international sanctions.268  However, these 
incentives were not enough to induce Iran to agree to the deal.  As a result, the new 
incentives need to be much stronger and much more powerful.  In addition to the already 
offered incentives, they should include provisions that make allowance for Iran to receive 
support from international financial institutions such as the World Bank.269  In addition, 
the new incentives should also include a universal settlement of all claims between the 
United and Iran, an amount that the Iranians consider to be significant.270  There should 
also be measures that provide incentives for foreign firms to invest in Iran, such as trade 
credits and investment guarantees.271  Last, and perhaps most importantly, the measures 
should include a provision to lift all sanctions against Iran—both international and 
unilateral.272  The lifting of the unilateral U.S. sanctions might have a game-changing 
impact on Iran’s decision to accept the proposal since most Iranians and Khamenei’s 
chief economic officials eagerly desire it.273  In addition to potentially jump-starting the 
sputtering Iranian economy, lifting the unilateral sanctions against Iran would also result 
in the opening of a large foreign market to U.S. companies.  This would potentially 
generate more jobs in the U.S.  Lifting both sets of sanctions would also signal to Iran 
that if Iran agrees to stop enriching uranium and halt its nuclear weapons program, then 
the world would no longer see it as a threat.  These measures are designed to appeal to 
Khamenei and both his advisors as well as the Supreme National Security Council and 
the Majles.  All three will benefit from accepting these measures.  Khamenei will be seen 
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as a great leader for taking on the West and gaining greater rewards for driving a hard 
bargain.  The Supreme National Security Council members will see a lifting of the 
sanctions against selling arms to Iran, so they will be able to better arm Iran.  The 
members of the Majles will each individually use the great breakthrough with the West as 
a basis for reelection.   
3. Security Guarantees 
With the recent announcement of the withdrawal of all American forces from Iraq 
by the end of 2011, the U.S. is already taking substantial measures—whether 
intentionally or not—to reduce Iran’s legitimate security concerns.  However, a 
significant U.S. presence will remain in the Persian Gulf, despite the withdrawal of troops 
from Iraq, both because of the concerns of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states 
who look to the U.S. for protection, and because of the vital national interests the U.S. 
has in that region.  Consequently, while the threat of a massive ground invasion has been 
reduced, the threat of coercive military action against Iran has not ceased completely—
there are also still thousands of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan, in addition to those 
stationed in the Persian Gulf area.  As a result, before Iran accepts the new deal, some 
security guarantees may be needed.274  Some have proposed that President Obama could 
publically pledge not to attack Iran; much like President Kennedy did for Cuba during the 
resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis.275  It is not likely however, that this by itself will 
be enough to convince the Iranians that the U.S. is sincere.  Thus, others have 
recommended limiting the number of U.S. aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf at any one 
time.276  Since the idea of hindering the United States’ ability to, if needed, act quickly 
and forcefully in the Middle East is unappealing to many Americans, and since Iran 
wants to increase its regional influence, then perhaps a win-win strategy is for the United 
States to initiate a Commission on Persian Gulf Security and Cooperation which involves 
all the Gulf States, the U.S., and Iran (the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
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Europe could be used as a good starting point).277  In addition to giving Iran a voice in 
the security matters of the Persian Gulf, it would also increase Iran’s political influence in 
the region.  These measures will serve to gain support amongst the members of the 
Supreme National Security Council, Ahmadinejad, Khamenei’s advisors and Khamenei 
himself since it will serve to increase Iran’s regional influence and status. 
4. Political Incentives 
The creation of a Commission on Persian Gulf Security and Cooperation 
organization would be helpful in both addressing Iran’s legitimate security concerns as 
well as provide Iran a greater role in the region.  This could be a test-bed to see how well 
Iran is able to interact with other countries in a multi-national forum, while not being the 
hegemon.278  It would also allow the Iranians’ security concerns to be assuaged by the 
Gulf States, instead of just the United States.  The security architecture and agreements 
that may result from such a Commission would likely have additional second- and third-
order effects of lowering the price of oil globally as the perception of relative stability 
descends on nervous speculators.   
Furthermore, if Iran accepts the deal and both the international and unilateral 
sanctions are lifted, it would potentially clear the way for Iran to join the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO—which includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan as full members, and India, Iran, Pakistan, and 
Mongolia as observer states ) which was primarily a security coordination and 
cooperation organization, and is starting to expand into a political and economic 
cooperation organization.279  Though Iran applied for full-membership in the 
organization in 2008, it was not granted status due to the members adopting membership 
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rules that forbade admission to any country under UNSC sanctions.280  Thus removing 
those sanctions would theoretically pave the way for Iran to gain admission to an 
organization whose members represent half and of the world’s population, and therefore 
provide a stronger voice in the region.  This measure would affect members of the 
Supreme National Security Council, Ahmadinejad, Khamenei’s advisors and Khamenei 
himself since it will serve to increase Iran’s regional influence and status.  It will also 
prove to be beneficial to the members of the Majles as well since they would be able to 
take credit for ratifying any treaties that precipitate out of Iran joining the SCO. 
C. DISINCENTIVES 
Just as the previous efforts to entice Iran into giving up its nuclear program were 
not strong enough, the previous efforts to coerce Iran into giving up its nuclear program 
were not strong enough either.  As a result, the disincentives, aka punishments or costs, 
need to be substantially stronger.  In his book, Negotiating with Iran, former Iranian 
hostage and Obama administration point-man for Iran at the State Department, John 
Limbert, writes that, “Iran does not respond to pressure.  Iran only responds to a lot of 
pressure.”281  As such, the additional measures need to not only be stronger, but need to 
target the key decision-makers and groups involved with the nuclear program:  the 
Supreme Leader, the President, the AEOI, the IRGC, the SNSC, and the Majles.  These 
individuals and groups all rely on the Iranian economy to provide the monetary funds 
necessary for the nuclear program.  Therefore, a significant portion of the new proposed 
sanctions will focus on some aspect of the Iranian economy.  These measures are 
designed to target specifically those who rely on traditional government revenue for their 
funding, such as Ahmadinejad, the IRGC to some degree, and the AEOI, as well as the 
Majles.  Khamenei will be affected as well, but additional measures that target his extra-
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governmental funds will be needed to affect him personally. The rest of the proposed 
measures will focus on other, non-economic methods of bringing even greater pressure to 
bear upon those decision-makers.   
1. Economic Disincentives 
Iran’s economy is most vulnerable in two areas:  the oil and gas industry, and the 
centrality of the Central Bank of Iran (aka Bank Markazi).  Iran is vulnerable in the oil 
and gas industry because 85% of its revenue is generated through the oil sector.282 Iran is 
vulnerable with regards to the Central Bank of Iran because it is the main pillar for the 
Iranian economic system since it alone issues currency and oversees all the banks—both 
state and privately owned.283 As such, two of the most powerful tools to use against Iran 
are to sanction Iran’s oil and gas exports and any country that buys them, and to sanction 
the Central Bank of Iran.   
Preventing Iran from selling oil and gas is a contentious idea.  Some say that if we 
prevent Iran from exporting oil, that it would serve to push the price of oil per barrel to 
economically damaging levels.284  Proponents of this viewpoint also argue that if we 
prevent Iran from importing gasoline, that Iran might respond by halting its oil exports, 
and create the same problem.285  As a result, they argue, sanctioning Iran’s oil and gas 
exports and imports should be used as a last resort.286  However, Saudi Arabian Prince 
Turki al-Faisal has stated that Saudi Arabia has enough spare production capacity to 
instantly make-up for any decrease in Iranian output—whether it results from sanctions 
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or something else.287  Since the Iranian economy is almost entirely dependent on oil 
exports, and since Saudi Arabia has the capacity to cover any decrease in Iranian exports 
of oil, then in order to truly affect the regime’s decision-making calculus the United 
States should work within the UN Security Council to sanction Iran’s export of oil.  In 
addition, the U.S. should consider working within the Security Council to emplace 
sanctions on Iran’s import of gasoline.  There are costs and benefits to this 
recommendation, however.  If the international community emplaces and enforces 
sanctions on Iran importing gasoline, then Iran will almost assuredly begin claiming that 
women and children are dying as a result in order to erode international support for the 
sanctions.288  On the benefits side though, preventing Iran from importing gasoline 
would also strike a blow against another antagonist of the U.S., Venezuela, who has been 
providing gasoline to Iran for several years.289 
The other main economic pillar the U.S. should strike is the Central Bank of Iran.  
The U.S. should consider garnering international support in the UN Security Council to 
sanction the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and by doing so, close off the international 
financial community to Iran by preventing any international financial transaction with the 
Central Bank of Iran.290  This would effectively cripple Iran’s economy and make it 
much more expensive for companies to trade with Iran.291  As with most policy options 
however, there is some risk.  By preventing Iran from being able to conduct international 
financial transactions, Iran would have to find irregular methods of obtaining payment for 
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its oil.292  This would take time for Iran and during that time, unless the sanctions were 
coordinated with Saudi Arabia, the world may face a decreased amount of oil available 
for purchase, thus resulting in a sharp increase in the price of oil.293  The benefit though, 
would be that Iran suffers a major decrease in revenue as a result of not being able to sell 
its oil on the open market.   
The reason that decreasing Iran’s revenue will be so powerful is because Iran, 
through Ahmadinejad’s populist programs, is providing payments to the Iranian populace 
to the tune of $3 billion a month, or $36 billion a year, in order to offset the rise in prices 
of oil, gas, electricity, bread, etc. due to the end of Iran’s subsidizing program.294  Iran’s 
oil and gas revenue is currently estimated for the 2011–2012 year to amount to 
approximately $103 billion.295  The subsidies then comprise approximately 35% of that 
revenue.  Furthermore, since 85% of Iran’s revenue comes from oil and gas, then that 
means Iran’s estimated revenue for the 2011-2012 timeframe is approximately $121 
billion, of which the payouts to the populace comprise 30%.  So sanctioning Iran’s oil 
and gas industry would have a crippling effect on the Iranian economy because 
Ahmadinejad, with the Majles’ and Supreme Leader’s approval, has the Iranian 
government paying out 30% of its earnings to the people in order to offset the rise in 
prices due to the end of the subsidy programs.  By restricting the amount of revenue Iran 
would bring in, it may further heighten the tension between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad 
as the resource scarcity leads to competition over where the limited funds should be 
spent.  In addition, it will force Ahmadinejad, the Majles, and Khamenei to choose which 
programs get funded and which do not, which may result in either the nuclear weapons 
program being shut down, or the populace no longer receiving funds to offset the increase 
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in prices.  This in turn may result in an economic recession or depression as consumer 
spending greatly decreases and unemployment increases.  Thus by plunging the Iranian 
economy into such dire straits, it may help set the conditions for a popular uprising, 
which is discussed in the next section. 
Both recommendations for stronger sanctions are focused on the two pillars of the 
Iranian economy—oil exports and the Central Bank of Iran.  By preventing Iran from 
legally exporting its oil, or by preventing Iran from legally selling its oil (or selling 
anything internationally), these recommendations are targeting Iran’s ability to generate 
revenue.  As Iran’s revenue falls, so too does its ability to provide for its people and thus 
these recommendations target Iran’s leaders—Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, who controls 
the economic policy for the country, as well as the Majles—and could work hand-in-hand 
with the next set of recommendations that are focused primarily against Khamenei, 
Ahmadinejad, the IRGC, the Supreme National Security Council, and the Majles.   
2. Regime Change 
The one thing that an autocratic leader fears most is a violent coup.  Khamenei is 
no stranger to this fear, having participated in the overthrow of the Shah and thus seeing 
firsthand the destruction that can result.  In fact, the one time that Khamenei seemed truly 
open to negotiations with the U.S. over that status of the Iranian nuclear program and 
Iran’s support for terrorists, was in 2003 when the U.S. had already invaded Iraq and 
achieved in a matter of weeks what the Iranians were not able to accomplish in eight 
years:  destroy Saddam’s army and overthrow his government.  Only after that, when the 
military might of the U.S. was arrayed on two of Iran’s borders (Iraq and Afghanistan), 
did Khamenei seem willing to negotiate.  As a result, the only way to bring significant 
amounts of pressure to bear on Khamenei—and thus the IRGC and other hardliners—is 
to threaten regime change.  The most effective approach to threaten the regime should 
involve the minority groups and ethnic groups staging a coordinated insurgency or 
uncoordinated insurgencies.296  It would also utilize the urban youth as the nucleus of a 
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popular uprising.  The main goal would be to simply apply additional points of pressure 
on the regime, specifically Khamenei, in order to bring him to the negotiating table.297  If 
the regime should be overthrown however, that would at least lead to a delay in Iran’s 
obtainment of nuclear weapons during which time the U.S. could attempt to establish a 
friendly relationship with the new government and provide many more incentives to 
prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. 
Iran is a heterogeneous nation with numerous ethnic groups that are less well-off 
than the dominant Persians, and therefore opportunities for stirring up resentment 
amongst those groups abounds.  The Persians comprise 61% of the population in Iran, 
followed by the Azeris at 16%, then the Kurds with 10%, the Lurs with 6%, and the 
Balochs, Arabs, and Turkomen with 2% each and 1% for other minorities.298  Khamenei 
is an Azeri and thus, the Azeris are not likely to be as prone to resorting to an insurgency 
in order to affect political change.  However, the Kurds, the Balochs, Arabs and the 
Turkomen have a history of fighting against the regime and remain displeased with their 
current status.299  These groups, some of whom have elements that are fighting against 
the regime currently, such as the Balochi Sunni-insurgency group Jundallah, would all be 
likely candidates for covert U.S. assistance.300  In order to make these groups more 
effective, they need to focus on targeting those instruments of the state that are either 
located in Persian areas (such as the nuclear facilities), or are dominated by Persians.  
Doing so will ensure that when the state responds with overly-repressive measures then 
those measures will help to crystallize the ethnic group’s identity and will elevate 
awareness of the group’s issues, both of which will serve to increase support for the 
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group.301  In addition, by attacking the Persian areas and Persian-dominated groups, the 
ensuing government response will serve to paint the conflict between ethnic groups, thus 
further crystallizing the ethnic group’s identity because it will help the ethnic group 
recognize that they now have a common enemy:  the Persians.302   
The urban youth are the other main demographic that should be mobilized.  In 
2003, 59% of Iran’s population was under the age of 24, with that figure climbing to over 
60% in 2011.303  In 2011, the median age in Iran was estimated to be approximately 26.8 
years old.304  In 2005, 60% of women between 18–30 years of age in an urban area had a 
university degree, while the number for men was 50%.305    Iran currently has 
approximately 11.1% unemployment rate, yet despite the well-educated background of 
most Iranian young adults (age 15–29), they account for approximately 70% of the 
unemployed.306  In addition, because they are not able to obtain jobs, they are not able to 
support themselves and thus cannot get married.307  As a result, this demographic is 
somewhat excluded from the rest of Iranian society.  Additionally, Iranian internet users 
make up over 50% of all internet users in the Middle East, and the Iranian youth are 
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thought to be the largest body of internet users in Iran in which 46% use the internet.308  
Given that the U.S. has no embassy in Iran and military information broadcast systems 
have limited range, then the best way to reach this population group that feels excluded, 
is largely unemployed, and largely single is the internet.  Thus the internet should be used 
to mobilize the youth, particularly in the urban areas, to begin pressing for change.  
Additionally, the incentives for Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program should be 
broadcast through the internet in order to generate grassroots support amongst the internet 
users—specifically the youth, but also the upper and middle-class and the educated—for 
Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program and accept the positive inducements offered 
to it.       
When these recommendations of courses of action to threaten regime change and 
thus influence Khamenei’s and the IRGC’s decision-making calculus are taken in 
conjunction with the recommended additional sanctions, the effects of both will be 
amplified.  The regime will need to spend more money to fund operations to suppress the 
insurgency, while simultaneously the regime will be receiving less money in revenues.  It 
will have to make a difficult decision as to whether to continue to spend large sums of 
money on the nuclear weapons program (and other military programs), and risk an 
increasingly disaffected population and therefore possible revolt, or to stop spending 
money on the nuclear program and provide for the people in order to ensure regime 
survival.  Therefore, these measures target those with vested interest in regime survival, 
most notably Khamenei, as well as the IRGC, Ahmadinejad, the Supreme National 
Security Council, the Majles, and even the AEOI. 
3. Non-Economic Methods 
The last element to bring pressure against Iran and affect Khamenei’s decision-
making involves Syria, Hezbollah, and Dubai.  Iran’s only ally in the Middle East is 
Syria.  Though the alliance is not necessarily one of shared culture or values, it is still a 
strong relationship that is based on mutual enemies, mutual friends (such as Hezbollah 
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and Hamas), and economic, military, and nuclear cooperation.309 The Syrian facility, al-
Kibar, at Deir al-Zour, destroyed by an Israeli strike in 2007, was assessed by the IAEA 
in 2011 as being a covert nuclear reactor built with assistance from North Korea and 
likely Iran.310 In addition, Iran also uses Syria as a way-point for transporting weapons to 
Hezbollah and Hamas.311  In fact, after a meeting in June 2011 between the Syrian 
Deputy Vice President for Security Affairs Muhammed Nasif Kheirbek and the Quds 
Force Commander Qassem Suleimani, Iran agreed to provide $23 million to Syria in 
order to build a base in Latakia, Syria to better facilitate arms shipments coming from 
Iran and being meted out to Hezbollah, Hamas, and of course, Syria to help with their 
domestic unrest.312  While the economic cooperation between the two is not substantial, 
it may grow that way as Iran becomes more and more isolated.   
As a result of the cooperation between the two, it might be wise to incorporate the 
tactic of supporting the Syrian opposition against Syria’s current regime in order to 
continue to weaken Syria, keep it facing inwards, and by doing so further weaken Iran by 
causing Syria to potentially ask Iran for more money and equipment.  If this step was 
taken in conjunction with the economic disincentives and regime change 
recommendations already provided, it would further serve to weaken Iran financially, or 
if Iran is not able to provide more money or resources to Syria, then it would weaken Iran 
strategically.  In addition, if the opposition were to win in Syria, then it is possible that 
Iran’s land-bridge to Hezbollah and Hamas—via Shia-Iraq and friendly Syria—would be 
destroyed, thus not only weakening Hezbollah and Hamas, but in the process of 
weakening those two proxies of Iranian influence abroad, also weaken Iran further. 
The final way to apply pressure to Khamenei and the IRGC especially is by 
convincing the United Arab Emirates to apply and enforce stronger regulations to Dubai 
regarding trade with Iran.  Dubai is known as “Iran’s offshore business center” with 
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nearly 400,000 Iranians living in Dubai and comprising 17% of Dubai’s population.313 In 
addition, Dubai has over 8,000 Iranian business and 1,200 Iranian trading companies that 
operate within its borders.314  This enormous Iranian ex-patriot populace provides an 
easy avenue for the IRGC (Iran’s state-sponsored smugglers), to gain access to Western 
markets in order to procure technologies and products that, due to sanctions, Western 
companies are currently prohibited from selling to Iran.  In 2009, trade between Iran and 
Dubai amounted to approximately $12 billion, and consisted of both legitimate trade such 
as pistachios, carpets, household appliances, and petrochemicals, and illegitimate trade 
such as field-programmable gate arrays, field communicators, integrated circuits, 
microcontrollers, and Global Positioning Systems (GPS).315  If this “offshore business 
center” were denied to Iran, they would likely shift to other free-trade zones scattered 
throughout the world, but none that would provide as easy access as Dubai.  As a result, 
denying Dubai to Iranian business, and particularly the IRGC, would substantially impact 
the IRGC’s ability to procure illicit and banned goods, as well as slow down the Iranian 
economy.  In addition, it would take many years for Iran to bring the level of trade in the 
new area up to the level it was at with Dubai, and during that time, Iran would lose both 
valuable revenue, and valuable western products.  This would cause difficulty not only 
for the IRGC and its military hardware and its military research and development 
projects, but also for the average Iranian citizen.  As such, it would apply additional 
pressure to the IRGC (and likely result in hardening their determination to gain access to 
those products they are not allowed to have), additional pressure on the Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran as their supply of products is severed, potentially make life more 
difficult for the average Iranian, and by doing all the above, put additional pressure on 
Khamenei. 
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And so, the final problem to deal with is how to gain Russia and China’s support 
for recommended stronger sanctions against Iran.  Fortunately, recent events in the fall of 
2011 have made this more politically feasible as Iran has been caught red-handed funding 
a Quds Force plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, DC.316  In 
addition, the IAEA issued a report on November 8, 2011 to the UN Security Council in 
which it says, “Iran is suspected of conducting secret experiments whose sole purpose 
can only be the development of nuclear arms.”317  As such, the political environment that 
Iran operates in has started to change and as a result, it may be easier to convince Russia 
and China to agree to the recommendations proposed. 
D. HOW TO BRING RUSSIA ON BOARD 
Russia supports Iran because it is in its interests to do so.  Iran is Russia’s main 
trading partner in the Middle East with 2009 bilateral trade amounting to approximately 
$3 billion.318  This trade is driven by Russia’s desire to establish trade and transportation 
links to the Persian Gulf, to coordinate gas and oil export policies (since the two countries 
have the largest gas deposits in the world), and to counter Western, and more specifically 
U.S., influence in the Middle East.319  Yet Russian policies are realist-based and thus the 
way to garner additional Russian support for the recommended measures hinge on 
showing Russia it is more beneficial for Russia to cooperate with the U.S. than with Iran.  
The U.S. might accomplish this by encouraging Russia’s growing ties with Israel, and 
leverage Russo-Iranian energy competition.320 Russia has recently purchased 
sophisticated Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from Israel, ostensibly for Russia to 
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help patrol the thousands of miles of pipeline Russia has.321  If the U.S. and Israel can 
encourage Russia to purchase more from Israel, then Russia may reduce its level of 
support for Iran so that it does not alienate the increasingly important trading partner 
Israel.322  In addition, both Russia and Iran compete to provide energy and especially 
natural gas to Europe, as well as to control the energy resources in the Caspian Sea 
region.323  The U.S. should convince its European allies to offer Russia more favorable 
deals on purchasing energy from Russia in exchange for Russia abandoning support for 
Iran.324  Using both Israel and Europe in these manners should begin eroding Russia’s 
support for Iran and gaining Russia’s support for stronger sanctions. 
E. HOW TO BRING CHINA ON BOARD 
China is the other major actor whose support in the UN Security Council Iran 
enjoys.  Like Russia, China’s leaders are realists and are more concerned about China’s 
security and prosperity than they are about a nuclear-armed Iran.325  China’s main 
interest in Iran is as an energy provider, and their secondary interests are as an arms 
market and as a foothold in the Middle East.326  As such, the way to begin moving 
China away from Iran involves finding China alternative supplies for energy.327  The 
U.S. has many oil partners, and for those in the Middle East, it is in their strategic 
national interest to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power.  As such, the U.S. and 
its Middle Eastern allies should work together to provide better oil deals to China in order 
to wean China off of Iranian oil.328  In addition, the U.S. should work to find other 
economic incentives to persuade China that it is in China’s interests to cooperate with the 
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U.S. and the West instead of with Iran.  Such incentives could include trilateral 
negotiations with Iraq on investments in Iraqi oil fields or Afghanistan mineral deposits, 
joint Sino-U.S. energy ventures such as research and development in alternatives to oil, 
or Sino-Russian trade or energy agreements sponsored by the U.S.  Regardless, 
convincing Russia and China that it is in their best interests to cooperate with the West 
and the U.S. instead of Iran should focus on economic inducements since the U.S. and the 
West have much greater resources and markets to offer. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This study began with an idea that the current U.S. strategy being used against 
Iran was founded upon an inaccurate understanding of who the true decision-makers were 
in Iran with regards to the Iranian nuclear weapons program.  An in-depth study of the 
history of the Iranian nuclear weapons program was undertaken in order to identify those 
true decision-makers.  The hypothesis was that once those decision-makers were 
identified, the correct deterrence lens could be applied to develop a more effective 
strategy.  Instead what was found was that there was no one particular lens and that Iran 
was best viewed through the three lenses of Rational Actor model, Organizational 
Behavior model, and Government Politics model.  Thus any strategy that used only one 
lens was bound to fail.  As a result, a new strategy focused more on coercive diplomacy 
was created using those three lenses that focused on the rationality of each individual 
decision-maker as well as the rationality of the groups involved and the politics of the 
groups involved.  The economic inducements of offering membership into the World 
Trade Organization, resumption of pre-sanctions trade with Japan and Europe, lifting of 
both international and unilateral sanctions, allowing Iran to obtain funds from 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and providing measures to 
encourage foreign investment in Iran are tailored to gain support from not only the 
pragmatists, but also the hardliners to show them that it is better to give up the nuclear 
weapons program than to continue it.  As such, these measures focus predominantly on 
the Majles, Ahmadinejad, and the IRGC.  In order to help their decision-making calculus, 
especially that of Khamenei, the Supreme National Security Council and the IRGC, the 
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disincentives proposed included sanctioning Iran’s oil and gas exports and the Central 
Bank of Iran, as well as covertly threatening regime change by using minority and ethnic 
groups and the massive number of unemployed youth to bring riots, protests, insurgencies 
and possible revolt to Khamenei’s doorstep, and therefore the doorsteps of the Supreme 
National Security Council and the IRGC.  The remaining tactics to use to bring further 
pressure on Iran involves attacking their alliances with Syria and Hezbollah, and 
attacking their ability to access western markets through Dubai.  The combination of the 
sanctions that would limit Iran’s incoming revenue, the civil unrest and insurgencies 
which would cause Iran to spend more money and resources quelling the unrest, and 
further restricting Iran’s ability to access foreign markets via Dubai, would result in 
Khamenei and Ahmadinejad being forced to make difficult decisions as to what 
government programs they should fund with the ever-decreasing supply of funds.  It 
would also cause competition over scarce resources as the IRGC and the AEOI would 
likely resort to internal politics in order for each to procure funding over the other.  When 
the final measures are taken to wean China away from dependence on Iranian oil and to 
encourage Russia to conduct more trade with the West are taken, Iran’s two greatest 
supporters internationally will begin to withdraw their support.  All of the above 
measures, taken quickly within the current international environment that Iran has 
brought upon itself, would likely ensure Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, the IRGC, the AEOI, 
the SNSC, and the Majles would  all agree to save their own skin by canceling the 
nuclear weapons program and begin cooperating with the United Nations and the U.S. 
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